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The political economy of imprisonment : an analysis of local areas in the United States

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMPRISONMENT:

AN ANALYSIS OF LOCAL AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES

by

Samantha Renee Cumley

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Sociology
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2012

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Karen Heimer

ABSTRACT

Between the 1970s and 2000, the imprisonment rate in the United States increased by 700% (e.g., Beck and Harrison 2001). During the same time period, technological advancements and the decline of manufacturing production in urban areas eliminated many of the higher-paying blue collar job opportunities previously available to workers without college educations (e.g., Morris and Western 1999). The simultaneous large changes in imprisonment and labor markets are striking and the co-occurrence of these events suggests a possible connection between increasingly insecure employment conditions and rising imprisonment rates. Further, policies targeting the poor population (including criminal justice policies) became more punitive beginning in the 1970s. This is associated with a resurgence of Republican Party popularity and subsequent increase in imprisonment rates (e.g., Beckett and Sasson 2004). Furthermore, understanding the association between labor market conditions and imprisonment may be especially important for the criminal justice experiences of historically disadvantaged minority groups. Research has yet to consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., restricted blue collar opportunities) may influence imprisonment rates. It is unknown whether such labor market dynamics may better explain the exposure of historically disadvantaged racial minorities to criminal justice system control. The current project examines the issues raised in the foregoing discussion using a unique dataset created for this purpose. Data at the local-level are compiled from two primary sources: the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989 and 1999), and Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data (1990 and 2000) (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek 2010). In addition, this project

draws from two general election studies, "General Election Data for the United States" (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 1995) and American University Federal Elections Project data (Lublin and Voss 2001), and controls for criminal justice system characteristics using the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999) and The Book of the States (1990 and 2000). Findings suggest that the local percentage of men without college education and restricted blue collar employment rates for unskilled workers are positively associated with prison admission rates within the corresponding local areas. In addition, the local percentage voting for Republican presidential candidates is positively associated with prison admission rates. Further, concentrated disadvantage among local African American populations is significantly and positively associated with prison admission rates for this group. Conversely, concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage among Whites is significantly and negatively associated with prison admission rates for African Americans. In addition, the local percentage of unskilled African Americans is significantly and positively associated with prison admission rates for African Americans and Whites. Finally, the percentage of unskilled workers employed in blue collar industries is significantly and negatively associated with African American and not significantly associated with White prison admission rates.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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PH.D. THESIS

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This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Samantha Renee Cumley

has been approved by the Examining Committee
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ABSTRACT

Between the 1970s and 2000, the imprisonment rate in the United States increased by 700% (e.g., Beck and Harrison 2001). During the same time period, technological advancements and the decline of manufacturing production in urban areas eliminated many of the higher-paying blue collar job opportunities previously available to workers without college educations (e.g., Morris and Western 1999). The simultaneous large changes in imprisonment and labor markets are striking and the co-occurrence of these events suggests a possible connection between increasingly insecure employment conditions and rising imprisonment rates. Further, policies targeting the poor population (including criminal justice policies) became more punitive beginning in the 1970s. This is associated with a resurgence of Republican Party popularity and subsequent increase in imprisonment rates (e.g., Beckett and Sasson 2004). Furthermore, understanding the association between labor market conditions and imprisonment may be especially important for the criminal justice experiences of historically disadvantaged minority groups. Research has yet to consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., restricted blue collar opportunities) may influence imprisonment rates. It is unknown whether such labor market dynamics may better explain the exposure of historically disadvantaged racial minorities to criminal justice system control. The current project examines the issues raised in the foregoing discussion using a unique dataset created for this purpose. Data at the local-level are compiled from two primary sources: the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics1989 and 1999), and Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data (1990 and 2000) (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek 2010). In addition, this project

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The Local Labor Market and Political Context of Rising

Imprisonment

Between the 1970s and 2000, the U.S. imprisonment rate increased by 700%. By the end of this period, the United States now incarcerated more of its citizens than any other country (e.g., Beck and Harrison 2001). Simultaneously, the three decades prior to this experienced major shifts in labor markets (e.g., Morris, Bernhardt and Handcock 1994; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; Karoly and Burtless 1995; Esping Andersen 1999; Morris and Western 1999). Labor market scholars argue that technological advancements and the decline of manufacturing production in urban areas eliminated many of the higher-paying blue collar job opportunities that were previously available to workers without college educations (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson 2000; Wright and Dwyer 2003). Labor market conditions for this group became increasingly polarized (e.g., Wilson 1976, 1987, 1996; Harrison and Bluestone 1982, 1988; Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; McCall 2001).

The simultaneous large changes in imprisonment and labor markets are striking and the co-occurrence of these events suggests a possible connection between increasingly insecure employment conditions in local labor markets and rising imprisonment rates. In addition, policies targeting the poor population (including criminal justice policies) became more punitive in the 1970s. This co-occurred with a resurgence of Republican Party popularity and overall imprisonment rates subsequently increased (e.g., Beckett 1997; Garland 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004).

However, the relationships between labor markets, political contexts, and imprisonment rates are not yet understood fully. Much of the empirical work examining

associations between labor markets and imprisonment rates has focused thus far on unemployment rates (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Inverarity and McCarthy 1988; Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Colvin 1990; Chiricos and Delone 1992; Hochstetler and Shover 1997; Greenberg and West 2001; Smith 2004; Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2005). Research has yet to consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., in the percent of workers without college education and restricted blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers) may influence imprisonment rates. It is unknown whether such labor market dynamics may better explain the exposure of marginalized populations to criminal justice system control. Similarly, no research has investigated how specific labor market labor market shifts may combine with partisan political movements that redefined and fundamentally shifted policies targeting the populations most likely to face economic hardships and criminal justice control.

In addition, much of the existing research examining labor markets, partisan politics and imprisonment is at the national (e.g., Greenberg 1977; Laffargue and Godefroy 1989; Lessan 1991; Sabol 1989; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Michalowski and Carlson 1999) and state levels (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Inverarity and McCarthy 1988; Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Chiricos and Delone 1992; Greenberg and West 2001; Smith 2004; Stucky et al. 2005; Western 2006). Results from these studies are inconsistent. The U.S. is a very large and decentralized nation. Labor market conditions and prison admission rates vary considerably across smaller units of analysis. Past research has largely ignored this variation. The present study argues that it is possible that at least some of the inconsistencies in earlier studies may be due to important variation that is missed at higher units of aggregation.

The Disproportionate Consequences of Local Labor Market

Shifts for African Americans

Understanding the association between labor market conditions and imprisonment may be especially important for the criminal justice experiences of historically disadvantaged minority groups. African Americans are much more likely to be incarcerated than Whites (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western 2006). Specifically, scholars note that by the year 2001, African Americans were more than five times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites at the national level (e.g., Bonczar 2003; Mauer 2006; Western 2006; Uggen and Manza 2006).

Much of the previous research in this area examines the *racial threat* perspective, which predicts that the size of racial and ethnic minority group populations will be positively associated with imprisonment, as the perceived threat posed by these groups is greater when their populations are large and/or growing (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Melossi 1989). The present study argues that the perceived threat tied to racial and ethnic minority groups may actually reflect patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage between these groups, such that economic threat becomes "racialized," or linked to particular racial and/or ethnic minority groups.

Following the work of William Julius Wilson (1978, 2009), this dissertation argues that threat is not limited to the absolute size (and/or growth) of racial and ethnic minority populations, but rather derives from the concentration of economic disadvantage within particular racial and ethnic minority groups. More specifically, historical discrimination and labor market shifts (e.g., deindustrialization) resulted in concentrated disadvantage within many inner-city African American neighborhoods (Wilson 1978).

This concentrated disadvantage (and the appearance of social disorder that is often closely associated) may lead to perceptions of economic threat becoming linked to African Americans (e.g., Wilson 2009). In other words, as disadvantage becomes concentrated among minority groups, we see the merger of racial and economic threat, and thus an increase in levels of formal social control of this group and others living in proximity. I refer to this as the *racialized economic threat hypothesis*.

Indeed, some evidence suggests that the risk of criminal justice control for unskilled African Americans is linked with deteriorating economic conditions for unskilled workers. Western (2006: 31) finds that the majority of the increasing risk of incarceration occurs among unskilled men (regardless of race). Following the legacy of slavery, educational inequalities exist between African Americans and Whites (e.g., Wilson 1987, 2009). Thus, disproportionate risk of imprisonment for African Americans may be rooted in racial educational inequalities. However, it is unknown whether this may be more important than other factors (e.g., concentrated disadvantage) and whether the effects of these covariates differ across race.

To date, no study examines these potential explanations for the disproportionate risk of imprisonment for African Americans using race-disaggregated multivariate analyses. In addition, few studies of imprisonment by race utilize counties and local areas as units of analysis (for exceptions, see Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson 1987 and Percival 2010), and no study has examined the issues raised in the foregoing discussion at the local level. Thus, this project examines the effects of labor market contextual and race-specific socioeconomic disadvantage variables on race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas and uses a unique dataset created for this purpose.

Because there is no existing dataset that includes all of the information necessary to examine the research questions of this project, this project compiles the necessary data. More specifically, data are combined from two primary sources: the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Corrections Reporting Program 1989 and 1999), and Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data (1990 and 2000) (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek 2010). This project also draws from two general election studies, "General Election Data for the United States" (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 1995) and American University Federal Elections Project data (Lublin and Voss 2001). In addition, this project compiles data on crime and criminal justice system characteristics from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999) and *The Book of the States* (1990 and 2000).

The unit of aggregation and analysis is the Public Use Micro Area (PUMA), created by the U.S. Census (Ruggles et al. 2010). This is the most disaggregated geographical unit that is publically available. Measuring local labor market and economic conditions at this level is advantageous in that it provides a large reliable and nationally-representative sample and is well-suited to capture the labor market dynamics of metropolitan areas. Further, the data are examined at two time points (1990 – 2000). This longitudinal design allows for the control of for other important, but unmeasured and time-invariant characteristics of local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates.

Project Significance

Research has yet to consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., deindustrialization) affect the economic situations of less-educated workers and how the same shifts may also influence imprisonment rates. Evidence suggests that economic inequality increased for less-educated and racial minority populations who have been left behind by labor market changes (e.g., Western 2006). Historically disadvantaged minority groups and poor populations are disproportionately imprisoned (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western 2006; Uggen and Manza 2006) and this has major consequences for future generations (e.g., Western and Pettit 2010; Wakefield and Wildeman 2011).

This research is a necessary step in understanding how imprisonment patterns are shaped by local labor market conditions and economic inequality, and particularly their impact on minorities and the poor. Imprisonment is a major state intervention into individual lives, and some argue that mass incarceration has profound consequences that go beyond prison walls, including family disruption (e.g., Lopoo and Western 2005; Apel, Blokland, Nieuwbeerta and van Schellen 2010), negative outcomes for children of incarcerated parents (e.g., Wakefield and Uggen, 2010; Wildeman and Western 2010; Wakefield and Wildeman 2011, forthcoming) and labor market inequalities after release, as ex-convicts often face difficulty finding employment (e.g., Pager 2003; Western 2002, 2006, 2007; Pager, Western and Bonikowski 2009). Further, incarceration is associated with a number of negative health outcomes, including HIV infection (e.g., Johnson and Raphael 2006; Maruschak 2006; Schnittker and John 2007). Results from this research may be used to inform policy in order to better target the issues facing groups experiencing economic hardship. Doing so may also help to reduce the unintended but

widespread and profoundly negative consequences of incarceration for family, health and subsequent labor market and economic hardships.

Plan of the Dissertation

This project focuses on two empirical analyses. First, Study One examines the effects of labor market contextual (e.g., beyond unemployment, such as blue collar employment opportunities) and political shifts on prison admission rates at the local level. Study Two examines the effects of *racialized economic threat* on rates of prison admission by race.

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature in the sociology of criminal punishment and research on labor markets used to derive my research questions and hypotheses for each of the two empirical portions of the project. Chapter 3 describes the procedures used to link and compile data, create variables, and the statistical techniques utilized in empirical analyses. Chapter 4 presents the results of Study One, which examines the effects of labor market and political contextual variables on overall prison admission rates across local areas. Chapter 5 presents the results of Study Two, which examines the effects of labor market contextual and race-specific concentrated disadvantage on race-disaggregated local prison admission rates. Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results of Chapters 4 and 5. The remainder of Chapter 6 discusses limitations of the project, directions for future research, and the significance of empirical findings, as they intersect with literature on the broader effects of mass incarceration. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the findings of this project for social policy.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL WORKS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

Chapter 1 discussed the co-occurrence of labor market and political shifts, rising imprisonment and the disproportionate consequences of labor market restructuring for the imprisonment experiences of African Americans. Given the foregoing discussion of empirical literature, this project is comprised of two empirical analyses. The current chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature used to derive my research questions and hypotheses for both analyses.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. It first reviews the theoretical and empirical background for each study. Interspersed in this review are discussions of the theoretical and methodological contributions of the current project. Finally, this chapter summarizes the theoretical frameworks of each empirical analysis and discusses research questions.

Theoretical Foundations for the Sociology of Criminal

Punishment

The relationship between labor markets and criminal punishment has long been of interest to social scientists. For example, Rusche and Kirchheimer's ([1939] 1968) seminal work maintains that since medieval times, the severity and frequency of criminal punishment varies with the labor market conditions of the working class. Specifically, these scholars argue that imprisonment rates do not simply respond to crime rates. Rather, imprisonment is a response to large and/or growing populations of idle or unemployed workers (surplus labor), as this group is often perceived to be threatening to social order and the position of elites.

In sum, Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968) argue that punitive criminal justice practices reflect labor market conditions, rather than crime rates, and this serves larger social purposes. One function of the criminal justice system is to manage the economic underclass, and especially the unemployed. This benefits the capitalist economic system, as excess labor supply is associated with reduced wages, and more punitive sanctions that discourage workers from utilizing alternative (e.g., criminal) means for income generation.

As argued by Chiricos and Delone (1992) subsequent research in this tradition often focuses on unemployment as a measure of labor surplus. These scholars cite, Jankovic (1977: 20) who argues that "a rise in unemployment will lead to an increase in prison commitments," as "the policy of deterrence dictates an intensification of punishment in order to combat the increased temptation to commit crime." In sum, higher unemployment rates reduce wages. This benefits the capitalist economic system, as lower wages are associated with increased profit margins. However, reduced wages in the formal (legitimate) labor market may also be associated with increased motivation for alternative methods of income generation in the informal (i.e., illegitimate or criminal) labor market. Thus, the certainty and severity of imprisonment must be great enough to deter would-be criminals, especially during periods of high unemployment rates (e.g., Jankovic 1977).

Further, scholars argue that a high rate of idleness within the labor force is problematic for the legitimacy of capitalist economic organization and, thereby, problematic for the maintenance of social order (e.g., Spitzer 1975; Jankovic 1977; Wallace 1980; Adamson 1984). Thus, the criminal justice system may be utilized by state

managers as a means to control potential threats to social order from economically

marginalized workers (e.g., Spitzer 1975). Criminal justice experiences are often most

prevalent young, active people, who are perceived to be the most "threatening" (a group

which Spitzer (1975:646) terms "social dynamite"). This perspective is often referred to

as the *economic threat hypothesis*.[1]

Similarly, other scholars argue that criminal justice controls are disproportionately

applied to certain groups of workers, and especially those who are economically

marginalized (e.g., Jankovic 1977; Quinney 1977; Box and Hale 1982; Melossi 1985;

Myers and Sabol 1987; Lynch 1988). For example, Lynch (1988:322) argues that

"marginalized workers" who are not subject to traditional "work-place controls" are much

more likely to be incarcerated or under supervision by the criminal justice system. Some

scholars argue that this is especially true for young males (e.g., Box and Hale 1982) and

young, African American males, in particular (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Melossi

1989). For example, Melossi (1989: 317) argues that unemployed young black males are

"a privileged target group for imprisonment" in the United States and England.

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Theory and Empirical Research: The Economic Threat

Hypothesis

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Much of the empirical research examining the effects of labor market conditions

on imprisonment rates focuses on unemployment rates and examines this relationship at

the national level or across U.S. states, and has largely reached inconsistent findings (for

a review, see Chiricos and DeLone 1992). Given the theoretical framework and the

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[1] In the criminological literature, the phrase *economic threat* refers to fear associated with marginalized groups (rather than economic competition between groups).

argument of Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968) and subsequent scholars (e.g.,
Jankovic 1977; Lynch 1988), imprisonment rates should rise as unemployment rates
increase, as the threat posed by economically marginalized groups is arguably greater
when unemployment rates are higher.

At the national level, some find that increasing unemployment rates are positively
associated with imprisonment rates (e.g., Greenberg 1977; Laffargue and Godefroy 1989;
Lessan 1991; Michalowski and Carlson 1993), while others find no independent effects
of unemployment on imprisonment rates (e.g., Sabol 1989). At the state level, some find
that unemployment is positively associated with imprisonment rates (e.g., Jankovic 1977;
Yeager 1979; Marenin, Pisciotta and Juliani 1983; Carroll and Doubet 1983; Parker and
Horowitz 1986; Myers and Sabol 1987; Inverarity and McCarthy 1988; Inverarity and
Tedrow 1988; Inverarity and Grattet 1989; Johnson, Wesley, Chiricos, Smith and
Blomberg 1990; Greenberg and West 2001; Western 2006), and others find that
unemployment has no independent effects on imprisonment rates once other factors are
controlled (e.g., Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Arvanites 1993; Jacobs and Helms
1996; Smith 2004; Stucky et al. 2005). Only three studies have examined the effects of
unemployment on imprisonment rates within counties and/or local areas, and these results
are also inconsistent. For example, McCarthy (1990) and Hochstetler and Shover (1997)
find that unemployment is significantly and positively associated with county-level
prison admission rates, while Colvin (1990) finds no such association.

Some of the inconsistencies in the empirical research may be due to
methodological differences. For example, a number of the studies in the foregoing
discussion employ cross-sectional analytical techniques (e.g., Nagel 1978; Carroll and

Doubet 1983; Johnson et al. 1990; McCarthy 1990; Arvanites 1993; Arvanites and Asher 1998). Cross sectional analyses cannot capture other important, but unobserved characteristics of states and local areas that may be associated with imprisonment, and thus, these estimates could be biased.

Furthermore, research at the national and state levels of aggregation may mask important variation at local levels. The U.S. is a large and decentralized country, and as such, labor market conditions and imprisonment rates may vary across smaller geographical units. Further, evidence suggests that the type of opportunities available to unskilled workers has changed over time and may be highly variable across urban labor markets (e.g., Hodson and Kaufmann 1982; Morris and Western 1999; Chevan and Stokes 2000; McCall 2000, 2001; Leicht 2008; Parks 2011). Thus, the optimal geographical unit of analysis for examining the overall effects of labor market changes on imprisonment rates is the local level.

In addition, it is problematic to rely on official unemployment measures to indicate labor surplus and economic hardship; these estimates do not include discouraged workers who are no longer looking for work (e.g., Chiricos and Delone 1992). Official unemployment rates may not fully capture the true amount of surplus labor, especially given labor market shifts in recent decades and restricted blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers (e.g., Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006).

Specifically, labor market opportunities and incomes became increasingly polarized from the 1970s to 2000 (e.g., Freeman 1991; Levy and Murnane 1992; Morris, Bernhardt and Handcock 1994; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; Karoly and Burtless 1995; Massey 1996; Nielsen and Alderson 1997; Esping Andersen 1999; Morris and

Western 1999). Technological innovations increased demand for college-educated workers and industrial production declined, eliminating many of the high-paying blue-collar positions that were previously available to unskilled workers (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson 2000; Wright and Dwyer 2003). This was particularly detrimental for unskilled men (e.g., Wilson 1976, 1987, 1996; Harrison and Bluestone 1982, 1988; Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; McCall 2001). In sum, the loss of blue-collar jobs occurring with deindustrialization, rising rates of employment in less-skilled service occupations and growth of wages in managerial and professional occupations are associated with increased inequality in the past 25 years (e.g., Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Acemoglu 2002; Lemieux 2008).

In addition, the association between unemployment and imprisonment rates may be historically contingent, and dependent upon the social meanings associated with unemployment during particular time periods and given the political and economic arrangements within capitalist economic development (e.g., Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Carlson and Michalowski 1997; Michalowski and Carlson 1999). Specifically, Michalowski and Carlson (1999) argue that the (qualitative) social meanings attached to unemployment and the size and composition of the "underclass" varies during certain historical periods in capitalist development.[2] Given the diversity of outcomes for

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[2] Specifically, Michalowski and Carlson (1999) argue that, following the Second World War (1933 – 1947), industrial production expanded and the labor market absorbed many (unskilled) displaced farm workers, thus reducing surplus labor at that time. The period 1948 – 1966 saw an increase in real wages and declining unemployment rates. The strength of organized labor and its ability to promote policies that were beneficial to the working class through its connection to the Democratic Party, and protected the working class against foreign competition. With the rise of industrial competition from other nations, the period 1967-1979 was one of labor market "decay," given the movement toward deindustrialization, the most marginalized workers began to be pushed out of the industrial sector and the "underclass" began to grow. The period 1980 – 1992 saw the continued loss of blue collar jobs following

unskilled workers in the post-industrial labor market (e.g., unemployment, idleness, part time/ temporary employment and lower-quality service sector positions), unemployment rates are less able to capture the amount of surplus labor in the population (e.g., Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006). Thus, structurally displaced workers are increasingly under-represented in official unemployment figures.

Additionally, evidence suggests that divisions among workers on the basis of skill (education) are growing (e.g., Grubb and Wilson 1989; Levy and Murnane 1992; Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Kreuger 1993; Murphy and Welch 1993; Morris and Western 1999; Reich 2000; Chevan and Stokes 2000; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000; McCall 2000, 2001; Elman and O'Rand 2004; Neckerman and Torche 2007; for a review, see Leicht 2008). Indeed, evidence suggests that many labor market indicators associated with larger demand-side shifts are also associated with inequality, including unemployment rates (e.g., Nielsen and Alderson 1997; Chevan and Stokes 2000), manufacturing decline (e.g., Chevan and Stokes 2000), the skill composition of the labor force (e.g., workers with less education) (e.g., Chevan and Stokes 2000), and the subsequent concentration of this group of workers in predominantly part-time, less-skilled and lower-paying service-sector employment following declines in skilled-blue collar labor market opportunities (e.g., McCall 2000, 2001). Overall economic conditions worsened for less-skilled workers, and especially unskilled men, who now earn lower wages on average and are more likely to be jobless (e.g., Goldin 1990; Lorence 1991; Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; McCall 2000, 2001; Western, 2006).

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deindustrialization a push of unskilled workers into service sector (lower quality) jobs created a widening gap and a relatively permanent displacement of unskilled workers.

Following these shifts, the working class may be considered "fractured," such that the post-industrial labor market is characterized by more flexible, mobile and decentralized workforce. Unlike the traditional (blue collar) "working class" of earlier decades, unskilled workers are now less likely to receive the benefits of full social citizenship (e.g., Marshall [1950] 1992) and social integration that regular, high-paying employment provides, nor are they subject to the same form of social control-producing economic organization (e.g., within the constraints of the factory) (e.g., Michaolowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006; Wacquant 2010). Thus, the forms of social control once offered by the labor market (i.e., higher rates of stable, high-paying employment) largely disappeared for this group of workers, and punishment scholars argue that criminal justice control became more punitive as a response to increasingly insecure employment conditions and as a response to a growing need for social control (e.g., Garland 2001; Di Giorgi 2006; Wacquant 2010). Clearly, this presents new challenges for social order, and requires moving beyond the Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968) framework.

Indeed, some national and state-level studies find positive associations between imprisonment rates other economic indicators, including poverty rates (e.g., Arvanites and Asher 1995; Western 2006) and income inequality (e.g., Arvanites and Asher 1995, 1998; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Western 2006). Additionally, evidence suggests that increases in prison admission rates have not been equal across levels of skill. Specifically, using matched pairs from two cohorts of men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY, 1979 and 1999), Western's (2006, Chapter 3)

bivariate analysis finds that men who do not attend college are at increasingly greater risk of imprisonment, and this risk has risen little, if at all, for college-educated men.

Indeed, the co-occurrence of deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and high levels of prison admission rates for unskilled workers suggests a possible connection. However, studies to date have not examined other dimensions of labor markets, such as the important changes that have occurred with deindustrialization (i.e., loss of higher-quality blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers). Arguably, indicators of labor market polarization, such as the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted blue collar employment opportunities, better capture shifts in marginalized populations that are disproportionately subject to state social controls, such as criminal justice supervision. In short, this project argues that it is important to examine how the quality of employment opportunities affects prison admission rates at the local level, as the concentration of these opportunities may vary considerably across smaller geographical areas.

<u>Theory and Empirical Research: The Political Context of</u>

<u>Imprisonment</u>

As Garland (1990) argues, criminal punishment is not necessarily or directly associated with the wishes of economic elites. Rather, it occurs within a larger context of political, social and ideological factors. Garland (1990) argues that Rusche and Kirchheimer's ([1939] 1968) framework does not account for other important institutions. For example, political ideology is important in gaining public support for the logic of imprisonment. Further, Garland (1990) argues that Rusche and Kirchheimer's ([1939] 1968) framework mistakenly assumes that punishment is used to control crime.

While this may appear to be true, Garland (1990) argues that there is little evidence to support the idea that punishment deters crime.   Rather, the rhetoric of deterrence may appear to benefit society as a whole but instead may often promote dominant interests and the maintenance of social order (e.g., by maintaining the status quo).

Indeed, while research on criminal punishment has long been informed by the classic work of Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968), there has been a resurgence of interest in the general idea that punishment is used by the state to solve problems of social order (e.g., Garland 1990, 1996, 2001; Savelsberg 1994; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Sutton 2000; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Tonry 2004; Gottschalk 2006; Wacquant 2009; Barker 2009). This follows the longstanding tradition in this area that views criminal punishment as inherently political (e.g., Foucault 1977; Garland 1990; Chambliss 1994; Savelsberg 1994). From this viewpoint, criminal punishment is not simply reactive to the "crime problem" but rather is a mechanism for controlling potentially problematic populations, such as the poor (Garland 1990: 134).

Specifically, Garland (1990, 2001), argues that one of the primary responsibilities of the state is to provide social order. Ideally, social order (or social control) is rooted in social institutions, such as the economy, the labor market and the family (e.g., Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). However, in the event that one (or many) of these institutions seems to have failed to provide social order (e.g., during times of economic downturn), state managers face greater pressure to restore order. One of the means for accomplishing is through the use of the criminal justice system, which is used not only to control crime, but also, more symbolically, to provide assurances of social order to the public (e.g., Garland 2001; Di Giorgi 2006; Wacquant 2009, 2010). Thus, politicians may use issues

of crime and criminal justice to demonstrate policy success during periods of social

uncertainty (e.g., Ignatieff 1980; Parenti 2000; Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2007).

Yet, the political context of imprisonment also reflects labor and economic

conditions. As Garland (2001) argues, increasingly insecure labor market conditions in

late modernity contributed to widespread economic anxieties and fears of overall "moral

decline," which may contribute to a greater need for social control and harsher criminal

justice polices and higher imprisonment rates (see also Melossi 1993; Gans 1995;

Chancer and Donovan 1996; Hogan, Chiricos, and Gertz 2005; Costelloe, Chiricos and

Gertz 2009). In sum, there is a tendency for state managers to use the criminal justice

system (and imprisonment) as a way to address problems of social order and to manage

the perceived threat posed by large and/or growing populations of economically

marginalized workers (e.g., Foucault 1977; Garland 1990; Jacobs and Helms 2001).

Threats to social order and political pressure for its maintenance may be greater in

times of economic uncertainty and when labor market and employment forecasts are

dismal. Thus, current criminal justice policies should be understood within a larger set of

policies governing the most marginalized, given a particular economic context and

prevailing ideological and social contexts. Put simply, the public is more content during

times of economic prosperity, and there is less pressure on state managers to use other

means (e.g., criminal justice control) to provide guarantees that they are effectively

maintaining social order.

Partisan Differences in Criminal Justice Policy

Scholars also argue that there are distinct partisan differences in the emphasis on

tougher criminal justice policy as a means for restoring social order (e.g., Thorne 1990;

Jacobs and Helms 1996, 2001, 2002; Beckett 1997; Feeley 2003; Weidner and Frase 2003; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Smith 2004; Yates and Fording 2005; Irwin 2005; Stucky et al. 2005; Western 2006; Spelman 2009). Specifically, scholars argue that since the 1970s, the tendency to utilize the criminal justice system to promote social order is most prominent in Republican partisan political rhetoric (e.g., Beckett 1997; Garland 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004). Indeed, many examples in the empirical literature suggest that Republican political candidates are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to posit that tightening controls and being "tough on crime" is the most effective crime control policy (e.g., Edsal and Edsal 1991; Scheingold 1991; Beckett 1997; Davey 1998; Helms and Jacobs 2002; Beckett and Sasson 2004).

Republican candidates may also have more to gain by pursuing tougher criminal justice policies, as their policies most often serve the interests of the wealthy (e.g., Hibbs 1987; Allen and Campbell 1994; Bartels 2008). For example, as Stucky and his colleagues (2005) argue, because the rich are a minority in the population, Republicans must also appeal to middle and working class swing voters if they are to be elected. Thus, scholars argue that the emphasis on tougher criminal justice policy is often part of Republican strategies to convince working- and middle-class voters to vote against their economic interests by appealing to fears of crime and to promote the view that Democratic candidates are "soft on crime" (e.g., Scheingold 1984, 1991; Chambliss 1994, 1999; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Beckett 1997; Tonry 1999; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Stucky et al. 2005).   Some evidence suggests that this rhetoric has been successfully utilized to win elections. For example, Helms and Jacobs (2002) reference the 1988 presidential election, in which Republican Candidate, George H.W. Bush, often

accused his Democratic opponent (Michael Dukakis) of being "soft on crime" and

ultimately won the election.[3] Consistent with this line of reasoning, empirical research

findings suggest that Republican leadership increases overall imprisonment rates at the

national (e.g., Jacobs and Helms 1996, 2001), state (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988;

Davey 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Smith 2004; Yates and Fording 2005; Yates

and Fording 2005; Western 2006; Spelman 2009) and county levels (e.g., Eitle et al.

2002; Weidner and Frase 2003).

Theoretical Linkages between Political and Economic Contexts

Social order is (at least partly) the result of latent political divisions created by

economic inequality (e.g., Vold 1958; Turk 1969; Black 1976; Collins 1975; Chambliss

and Seidman 1980). For example, those who hold political office are predominantly

economic elites (e.g., Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Domhoff 2002), and political policies

often favor this group. For example, tougher criminal justice polices may benefit

economic elites, as the control of "threatening" populations that are not in the labor force

and/or (are perceived to) engage in criminal activities may help to contain these "threats"

to the legitimacy of the capitalist marketplace.

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[3] Critics of the partisanship perspective argue that elections are largely decided by "moderate" voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum, and campaigning on any position that is too extreme negatively affects the likelihood of election (e.g., Raphael 2009). Yet, others argue that successful campaigns must not alienate their base of support (e.g., Bartels 2008). Specifically, the Democratic Party is historically tied to economically marginalized and African American voters who are more likely to be affected by punitive criminal justice policies (e.g., Western 2006). Conversely, some scholars argue that there is little to be gained (politically) by opposing tougher criminal justice policies, thus, Democratic candidates may likewise advocate for harsher penalties (e.g., Raphael 2009). To be sure, there is some evidence that differences in punitive ideology between Republican and Democratic parties has declined (e.g., Beckett and Sasson 2004; Greenberg and West 2001). However, given the volume of empirical research demonstrating that Republican dominance is linked to increases in criminal punishment, it is difficult to make the case that there are few partisan differences on the issue (for a review, see Jacobs and Jackson 2010).

Specifically, Jacobs and Carmichael (2002: 112) bridge the works of Chambliss and Seidman (1980) and Garland (1990). These scholars cite Chambliss and Seidman (1980: 31), who suggest that, "The more economically stratified a society becomes, the more it becomes necessary for dominant groups to enforce through the coercion of norms of conduct that guarantee their supremacy." Further, they complete their argument by citing Garland (1990: 123), who argues that, "Penal law, at base, concerns itself with social authority and the governing claims of those with power. It reinforces these claims by means of coercive sanctions as well as symbolic displays… Where social power and authority are structured upon class lines… then punishment will reproduce the forms and figures of class even when its actions appear to transcend class divisions and protect those on the wrong sides of the class divide." [4] Indeed, economically marginalized groups are often negatively stereotyped and portrayed as deserving of punishment (e.g., Schneider and Ingram 1997). In fact, Garland (2001: 133) argues that criminals are a "ready-made, deeply unpopular target population" that is easily scapegoated in times of social and economic insecurity, and that there is little to be gained (politically) for those who oppose punitive criminal justice policies.

Further, the partisan politics of "moral order" are also highly consistent with Rusche and Kirchheimer's ([1939] 1968) claim that incarceration is used to provide formal social control of poor populations (e.g., Smith 2004). Political rhetoric may be used to justify incarceration and minimize social unrest. For example, Republican candidates often strategically utilize rhetoric on individual accountability and personal responsibility with regard to poverty policy (e.g., Smith 2004). This is consistent with

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[4]These outcomes are most often the result of many powerful people acting in self-interest (and not necessarily collaborating).

ideology of the "American Dream" (i.e., it is an individual's choice to be poor), and is inconsistent with the historical position of the Democratic Party, which more often emphasizes structural factors in explaining poverty and inequality.

Labor market restructuring and the movement toward a service-based economy represent a challenge to the status quo and may contribute to the breakdown of labor market social controls (e.g., Garland 2001). Thus, the state responds to the public's need for reassurance following labor market shifts. As discussed previously, issues of crime control (e.g., based in cultural stereotypes of the poor) are an avenue through which politicians may demonstrate policy success during times of social and economic uncertainty (e.g., Parenti 2000) and while simultaneously serving the interests of the wealthy (e.g., Hibbs 1987; Allen and Campbell 1994; Bartels 2008). Thus, empirically observed partisan differences in criminal punishment may reflect the fact that Republican electoral success often benefits economic elites (e.g., via conservative/ neoliberal economic policies and tougher criminal justice control of the poor) (e.g., Jacobs and Helms 1996; Stucky et al. 2005).[5]

Yet, to date, no study has examined the effects of political partisanship in combination with more nuanced labor market indicators (e.g., the percent of workers without college education and blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers) on prison admission rates. In addition, few have examined the effects of political partisanship

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[5] In the Marxist sense, much of what is codified in the law as criminal behavior may be considered an ideological illusion, such that many crimes are acts disproportionately committed by poor people (e.g., vagrancy). In this vein, laws reflect the interests of economic elites and penalties are not necessarily proportional to offenses (e.g., harsher sentences for armed robbery as compared to financial criminals are not proportional with regard to the absolute amount of monetary theft). Further, (in the classical Marxist sense) emphasizing street crime may be a means with which to divide the working class and to create in-fighting. Thus, policing poor populations serves as a distraction from the actual sources of social problems and unrest: the capitalist economic system and the exploitation of the working class.

across local areas (for an exception, see Weidner and Frase 2003). Much of the research in this area is at the state and national levels. As discussed previously, analyses at the national and state levels may miss important variation, as labor market conditions, political partisanship and imprisonment vary across smaller geographical areas.

<div align="center">The Disproportionate Consequences of Local Labor Market</div>

<div align="center">Shifts for African Americans</div>

Given the co-occurrence of labor market restructuring and rising prison admission rates, Study One in this dissertation examines the effects of local labor market and political context on (overall) local prison admission rates. Yet, there is reason to suspect that the decline of blue-collar labor market opportunities disproportionately affected historically disadvantaged minority groups. For example, Wilson (1978, 1987, and 2009) argues that the loss of manufacturing positions associated with deindustrialization and the shift toward a service-based economy contributed to concentrated disadvantage within many inner-city African American neighborhoods. Some recent empirical evidence supports this claim (e.g., Quillian 2003; Parks 2011).

This project argues that concentrated disadvantage (and the appearance of social disorder that is often closely associated) may lead to economic threat and labor market competition becoming linked to African Americans, and thus, increasing the formal social control of this group and others living in proximity (e.g., Wilson 1978, 2009; Bonacich 1972). Indeed, the risk of incarceration is much greater for African Americans than Whites (e.g., Western 2006; Mauer 2006). Specifically, by the year 2000, African Americans were at least five times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites at the national level (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western 2006; Uggen and Manza 2006). Thus, Study

Two of this project examines the effects of local labor market opportunities and race-specific concentrated disadvantage on race-disaggregated prison admission rates.

Theory and Empirical Research: The Racial Threat

Hypothesis

Consistent with empirical findings on disproportionate risk of incarceration by race, punishment scholars have long argued that imprisonment rates respond to the size of racial and ethnic minority group populations, above and beyond crime rates (e.g., Jankovic 1977; Spitzer 1975, 1981; Yeager 1979; Box and Hale 1982). This perspective is often referred to as the *racial threat hypothesis*. Similar to the *economic threat hypothesis*, *racial threat* explanations argue that penal practices respond to perceived political and economic threats to majority racial and ethnic group interests posed by large and/or growing racial or ethnic minority populations (Blalock 1967; Myers and Sabol 1987; Melossi 1989).

Researchers in this tradition argue that increases in the size of minority population are threatening to majority group interests, privileges and social order (e.g., Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Liska 1992; Healey 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1996; Taylor1998; Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck 1998; Behrens, Uggen and Manza 2003). Arguably, perceived threats are greatest in places with large minority populations (e.g., Blalock 1967; Turk 1969; Brown and Fuguitt 1972; Barth and Noel 1972; Frisbie and Neibert 1976; Horowitz 1985). In sum, it is theorized that social (and criminal justice) control is used to manage the perceived threats posed by large minority populations (e.g., Spitzer 1975, 1981; Jankovic 1977; Yeager 1979; Box and Hale 1982).

Given the predictions of the *racial threat* framework, imprisonment rates should be highest in areas with the largest minority group populations. Consistent with this, empirical evidence suggests that states with larger African American populations have higher (overall) imprisonment rates (e.g., Meyers 1990; Taggart and Winn 1991; Arvanites 1993; Jacobs and Helms 1999; Beckett and Western 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Yates and Fording 2005; Western 2006). At the county level, Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson (1987) and Arvanites and Asher (1998) find that nonwhites in urban counties with larger minority populations are more likely to be incarcerated.

However, some empirical research linking minority group presence and imprisonment either fails to find this association or suggests that it is not linear (e.g., Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Stucky et al. 2005; Western 2006; Keen and Jacobs 2009). Specifically, some scholars argue that minority groups gain political power after reaching a population threshold (e.g., Blalock 1967; Jackson and Carroll 1981), and there is some evidence that smaller changes in minority group population size more strongly affect imprisonment rates in states and counties with smaller minority group populations (e.g., Jackson and Carroll 1981; Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Liska 1992; Yates 1997; Jacobs, Carmichael and Kent 2005; Keen and Jacobs 2009).

Arguably, some of the inconsistencies in earlier findings may be due to cross-sectional designs. For example, a number of the studies in the foregoing discussion employ cross-sectional analyses (e.g., Bridges et al. 1987; Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Yates 1997; Arvanites and Asher 1998). As noted earlier in this chapter, longitudinal analyses that allow researchers to control for these time-invariant unobserved

characteristics are preferable to cross-sectional analyses. The current project utilizes a longitudinal design, which examines prison admission rates for two time points (1990 and 2000). This overcomes the limitations of previous cross-sectional research and allows for the control of other important, time-invariant characteristics of states and local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates.

In addition, some of the inconsistent results may be due to variation that is masked at higher levels of analysis. Much of the research in the forgoing discussion is at the state level. Few have examined counties and local areas (for exceptions, see Bridges et al. 1987 and Percival 2010). As discussed previously, the U.S. is a very large and decentralized nation. Given this, minority group populations and risk of incarceration by race may vary across smaller units of analysis. As Crutchfield, Bridges and Pitchford (1994) argue, it is important to examine these associations at the local level, as higher units of aggregation may mask important variation.

Further, much of the existing research as examined the effects of minority group presence on overall (rather than race-disaggregated) imprisonment rates (e.g., Jacobs and Helms 1996; Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Stucky et al. 2005; for exceptions, see Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Hawkins and Hardy 1989; Yates 1997; Yates and Fording 2005; Percival 2010; Heimer, Johnson, Lang, Rengifo and Stemen 2012). However, as Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) argue, analyses of race-disaggregated rates are important, as examining overall rates cannot capture whether the effects of covariates apply to both groups. Arguably, analyses of race-disaggregated prison admission rates better capture sources of imprisonment

disparity (e.g., Bridges et al. 1987; Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Hawkins and Hardy 1989; Yates and Fording 2005; Heimer et al. 2012).

Scholars further argue that it is important to examine African American imprisonment rates vis-à-vis White imprisonment rates (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Heimer et al. 2012). Specifically, as Heimer and her colleagues (2012) argue, imprisonment rates for African Americans and Whites may associated with the same social and economic processes within a given geographical area. These scholars argue that other research examining race-disaggregated imprisonment rates failed to account for this possibility, and did not control for potential associations between African American and White imprisonment rates (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988).

Recent research by Jacobs and Keen (2009) examined racial imprisonment disparity in the count ratio of Black-to-White prisoners across U.S. states. However, their analysis examines only count ratios and fails to adjust for minority group population size. Arguably, this masks important variation across states with smaller African American populations, where Black-White imprisonment disparities may actually be greatest (e.g., Hawkins and Hardy 1989; Mauer and King 2007, Table 6). Furthermore, as Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) and Heimer and her colleagues (2012) argue, measuring imprisonment disparity as a rate-ratio cannot reveal race-specific differences in the effects of covariates, only whether the effect varies significantly across race. Thus, the current project moves beyond these limitations by examining the effects of labor market and race-specific socioeconomic contextual variables on race-disaggregated prison admission rates, while accounting for potential associations between African American and White rates.

Alternative Measures of Racial Threat

Although the exact association between minority population group size and imprisonment is still a source of scholarly debate, evidence suggests that the presence of racial minorities is associated with support for more punitive criminal justice policies. For example, the size of the African American population across U.S. states is associated with increased public support for tougher crime control policies (e.g., Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; King and Wheelock 2007), correctional expenditures (e.g., Jacobs and Helms 1999; Stucky et al. 2007; Breunig and Ernst 2011), the relative size and strength of law enforcement agencies (e.g., Liska, Lawrence, and Benson 1981; Jackson 1989; Kent and Jacobs 2005; D'Alessio et al. 2005; Stults and Baumer 2007), and the use of capital punishment (e.g., Jacobs and Carmichael 2002, 2004; Jacobs et al. 2007; Unever and Cullen 2007).

Additionally, Heimer and her colleagues (2012: 223-224) draw on works by Entman (1992) and Dixon and Linz (2000, 2002), which argue that fear of crime has become associated with urban African American populations. Additionally, although linkages between fear of crime and urban African Americans may be particularly strong, Heimer and her colleagues (2012) cite Patillo (1999: 24), who suggests that there has been a "spillover of urban Black enclaves into suburban communities." Thus, growth in the African American population that may be associated with fear of crime and perceived competition is not limited to Blacks residing in inner cities but may also include those living in metropolitan communities (Heimer et al. 2012). Indeed, their findings suggest that Black female imprisonment rates are positively associated with the concentration of African Americans in metropolitan areas. By contrast, female imprisonment rates for

nonblacks are <u>negatively</u> associated with the concentration of African American populations in metropolitan areas.

Given all of these findings, it is reasonable to suspect that the economic situations of African Americans may be associated with criminal punishment. In sum, it could be the case, as suggested by works of Wilson (1978, 2009) and others, that the association between race and criminal punishment occur because economic threat and fear of crime have become linked to impoverished racial minorities, and especially those residing in inner-city and metropolitan areas. Yet, much of the research examining imprisonment by race focuses on overall poverty rates (e.g., Yates and Fording 2005; Percival 2010; Heimer et al. 2012), income inequality (e.g., Bridges et al. 1987) and Black/White income inequality (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Yates 1997; Yates and Fording 2005). To date, only one study has examined the effects of race-specific economic indicators on imprisonment rates. Western (2006, Chapter 3) examines the effects of race-specific disadvantage on prison admission rates across U.S. states. Western (2006: 70) finds no significant association between unemployment rates for African American men and imprisonment rates after controlling for state and year effects.[6]

The social control perspective adopted here argues that, in addition to minority group size, other race-specific economic and labor market indicators (e.g., race-specific concentrated disadvantage and the percent of workers without college education) may be associated with prison admission rates. Given historical racial inequalities and the pronounced negative effects of labor market declines on less-skilled minority groups

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[6] Western's (2006) analysis is at the state-level and does not disaggregate prison admission rates by race. It is unknown whether this and other factors are associated with race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas and if these effects differ across race.

(e.g., Wilson 1987; Tigges and Tootle 1993; Huffman and Cohen 2004; Dickerson 2007), this project argues that these associations should be examined in more detail and using more nuanced, race-specific labor market and economic indicators. To date, no study has examined the effects of race-specific concentrated disadvantage on race-disaggregated imprisonment rates. To this end, this project examines theoretical connections between race, social class and labor markets (e.g., Reich 1971; Bonacich 1972) and the more contemporary critique of their application to race relations offered by Wilson (1978).

Theoretical Linkages between Racial and Economic Threat Perspectives

Some neo-Marxists argue that racial conflict is arguably a manifestation of class conflict, such that ideologies of racism, prejudice, discrimination and segregation are rooted in the division of labor in capitalist societies (e.g., Reich 1971). Specifically, competition among workers benefits the capitalist economic system, as it reduces worker bargaining power and wages, thereby increasing profits. Competition is also a source of division among lower-priced laborers, and this may reduce the likelihood of these groups coming together in solidarity against elites. Divisions along racial lines are arguably a source of competition among workers, and thus, often serve to benefit the capitalist economic system.

However, as Bonacich (1972) argues, racist ideology is not necessarily something that is used by economic elites with the goal of creating divisions among workers. Rather, the capitalist labor market permits all workers to compete "freely" with one another. In such a system, open competition often displaces higher-paid labor. These divisions become tied to race/ ethnicity (or, what Bonacich (1972) terms "ethnic antagonism")

when they occur within a labor market that is split on racial and/or ethnic lines (i.e.,

where the price of labor differs for at least two groups, or would differ if each

participated in the same work). In sum, Bonacich (1972) argues that if a labor market is

split on ethnic lines, then class antagonisms become racial/ ethnic antagonisms. Thus,

economic threat may become tied to particular racial and/or ethnic groups.

However, Wilson (1978) argues that neither early neo-Marxist (e.g., Reich 1971)

nor Bonacich's (1972) perspectives adequately describe contemporary race relations.

First, he argues that extremely disadvantaged African Americans and Whites are no

longer in direct economic competition with one another (as in antebellum or industrial

periods). Second, given skill bias in the labor market, most higher-paying positions now

require college education, which (given historical disadvantages) African Americans are

less likely to have. Third, Wilson argues that structural changes to the economy and

technological advances contributing to deindustrialization resulted in the out-migration of

both the white population and businesses from inner-cities. Ultimately, decreased demand

for unskilled labor led to higher rates of unemployment and joblessness within the black

underclass, which were heavily concentrated in these occupational positions.[7]

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[7] Specifically, Wilson (1978) argues that class has become more important than race in explaining race relations for African Americans. However, he argues that concentrated disadvantage among inner-city African American populations must also be understood within the context of historical racial inequality and discrimination. "Great Migrations" of African Americans from the southeastern portions of the U.S. to northern cities occurred during the Industrial Revolution (Wilson 1987). Prior to the 1960s, discrimination based on skin color was legal and widely practiced, and neighborhoods were highly (almost exclusively) racially segregated. Although segregated, African American neighborhoods often contained a greater diversity of socioeconomic status than do neighborhoods that are predominantly African American at present. Shortly following the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, many of the more advantaged and middle-class African Americans migrated out of inner cities and into suburban areas. Wilson argues that the remaining residents were often the most disadvantaged and with the fewest occupational skills. Making matters worse, labor market shifts in recent decades, such as deindustrialization and the movement toward a service-based economy, have contributed to concentrated disadvantage within inner-cities, as unskilled African Americans now have fewer employment opportunities than before. Thus the "ghetto poor" appear to have become increasingly socially and economically isolated.

Some recent empirical evidence supports Wilson's claims (e.g., Anderson 1999; Quillian 2003; Jaret, Reid and Adelman 2003; Wilson 2009). For example, Jaret and his colleagues (2003) found that the percent of unskilled African Americans is a strong predictor of racially-based income inequality across metropolitan areas. In addition, these scholars found that high local levels of manufacturing vis-à-vis low-skilled service employment are significantly and negatively associated with racial income inequality.

Wilson further argues that racial antagonisms will be more pronounced among lower class Whites and the Black "underclass" because of their inability to leave the inner city and the various urban problems they experience (e.g., high rates of crime, poverty, joblessness, and lower-quality of schools). Arguably, patterns of imprisonment by race are rooted in historical and contemporary race relations and labor arrangements that contribute to economic inequality for African Americans. Thus, social problems become associated with impoverished African Americans and the presence of this group may come to be perceived as threatening. Indeed, some scholars argue that criminal justice and poverty discourses are often racialized, in that prevailing cultural stereotypes often applied here are of lawless, violent minority males in underclass ghettos (e.g., Wacquant 2009).   Further, evidence suggests that issues surrounding criminal justice have become linked in the minds of White Americans as "Black" issues (e.g., Entman 1990; Roberts 1993; Barak 1994; Hawkins 1995; Tonry 1995; Barlow 1998; Entman and Rojecki 2000; Chiricos and Escholz 2002; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Barkan and Cohn 2005; Mauer 2006). For example, the size of the African American population is positively associated with fear of crime, net of actual crime rates (e.g., Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982; Quillian and Pager 2001; Chiricos, McEntire and Gertz 2001).

Indeed, some evidence suggests that the risk of imprisonment for African Americans is associated with deteriorating labor conditions for unskilled workers. As noted earlier in this chapter, risk of prison admission for unskilled men increased dramatically from 1980 to 2000 (and little, if at all, for their college-educated counterparts) (Western 2006, Chapter 3). For example, Western (2006) examined lifetime risk of imprisonment by skill-level across two cohorts of White and African American men using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 1979 and 1999), and found marked educational differences by race in imprisonment risk. Overall, unskilled African American men are at a much greater risk of imprisonment than their White counterparts. This difference is most notable for high school dropouts who are African American. Specifically, by the late 1990s, this group is nearly 48% more likely than their White counterparts to have been imprisoned at some point during their lives.

In an argument similar to Wilson's (1978, 1987, 2009), Western (2006: 78) speculates that incarceration among young, unskilled Black males followed the collapse of urban labor markets and the creation of jobless ghettos, as evidenced by his bivariate analysis, which finds unequal increases in prison admission rates for unskilled Black men compared to their White counterparts.[8] In addition, Western's (2006: 75) bivariate

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[8] It should be noted that Western (2006, Chapter 3) does not suggest that increased risk of imprisonment for unskilled men (and, unskilled Black men, in particular) is attributable to rates of crime committed by this population. In an earlier chapter, Western (2006, Chapter 2) finds that crime rates (including drug offenses) among poor and minority men declined from 1980 to 2000. In sum, Western (2006: 50-51) argues that increasing imprisonment rates during this time period occurred because the penalties associated with criminal conviction (and especially drug offenses) increased, such that criminal offenders are more likely to be incarcerated and serve longer sentences (on average).

analysis reveals that disparities in prison admission rates by skill and <u>within</u> race are greater than the Black-White disparity in prison admission rates.[9]

Given these findings, it is reasonable to suspect that the economic situations of African Americans may be associated with criminal punishment. In sum, it could be the case, as suggested by works of Wilson (1978, 2009) and others, that the association between race and criminal punishment occur because economic threat and fear of crime have become linked to impoverished racial minorities, and especially those residing in inner-city and metropolitan areas. I refer to this as the *racialized economic threat hypothesis*.

To date, no study has examined the effects of race-specific concentrated disadvantage on race-disaggregated imprisonment rates.[10] Further, restricted availability of blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers may provide a labor market context that is associated with concentrated disadvantage for African Americans (e.g., Wilson 1978, 2009). To date, no study has examined the effects of the availability of local blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers on imprisonment.

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[9] It should be noted that Western's theoretical argument overlaps with Wilson (1978, 2009). Western (2006: 78) argues that increasing incarceration among unskilled African American men is associated with deteriorating labor market prospects for urban unskilled workers and the subsequent patterns of concentrated disadvantage within inner-city African American neighborhoods.

[10] As discussed earlier, Western (2006, Chapter 3) examines the effects of race-specific disadvantage on overall prison admission rates across U.S. states. Western (2006: 70) finds no significant association between unemployment rates for African American men and imprisonment rates. However, the effects of race-specific labor market and socioeconomic conditions on race-disaggregated prison admission rates at the local level are unknown.

Summary of Theoretical Mechanisms and Research

Questions

Study One

To recap, this chapter argues that declining skilled blue collar employment

opportunities contribute to a growing and semi-permanent underclass of workers (e.g.,

Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006) that are often denied the full social

citizenship based on consistently available, higher-paying employment of decades past.

This contributed to the formation of pockets of economically marginalized, young,

jobless males and the appearance of social disorder (e.g., Wilson 1987, 2009; Anderson

1999; Clear 2003), which, in turn, contributed to widespread social anxiety and

perceptions of high crime rates and fears of moral decline. This may occur regardless of

actual crime rates; it is the *perception* of social disorder that becomes contextually

relevant in justifying tighter criminal justice controls. [11]

The perspective adopted here argues that in the presence of social disorder (i.e.,

growing pools of surplus labor) and lack of (informal) social control, there is need for

social control beyond that provided by the labor market, pressure on state managers to

maintain social order increases and criminal justice becomes more repressive (e.g.,

Garland 1990, 2001). This has occurred within a particular political context that has

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[11] Crime rates and imprisonment rates clearly are associated; however, the precise causal relationship remains unknown and, in fact, may be difficult to ever know with certainty. Some scholars argue that the prison boom of the past decades reduced crime through incapacitation and deterrence of potential offenders (e.g., Marvell and Moody 1997; Rosenfeld 2000; Levitt 2004; Spelman 2000, 2008). Yet, others argue that the effects of imprisonment on crime rates are small or non-significant (e.g., DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Western 2006). The present study does not attempt to resolve the question of causal order, but rather examines the effects of labor market, minority presence, and political contexts net of crime rates, with the important point being that criminal punishment is linked with societal processes beyond crime.

emerged, which supports the increased repressiveness of the criminal justice system, such that tightening criminal justice controls is often portrayed as the best way to restore social order/ "reduce" crime. This use of formal social control (i.e., criminal justice control) to reduce the (perceived) "threat" of economically marginalized groups is often referred to in the literature as the *economic threat hypothesis*.

Research has yet to consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., the percent of workers without college education and restricted blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers) may also influence imprisonment rates. It is unknown whether these may better capture the experiences of marginalized populations that are disproportionately subject to control through the criminal justice system. Similarly, no research has investigated the effects of economic and labor market shifts as they coincided with partisan political movements that redefined and fundamentally shifted policies targeting the populations most likely to face economic hardships.

Given this theoretical framework and the empirical research in this area, the first study in this dissertation asks the following questions:

1) How are the worker characteristics of local labor forces (i.e., concentration of men who are unskilled) and the types of opportunities available in metropolitan area labor markets (i.e., the availability of blue collar positions for unskilled workers) associated with imprisonment rates? In other words, are the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted and blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated (formal) criminal justice system control?

2) Do partisan differences (i.e., Republican leadership and/or support for Republican candidates) across states and local areas influence imprisonment rates? In other words, given the empirical research in this area, are state Republican leadership and/or local support for Republican political candidates associated with prison admission rates?

3) Do local labor market and political contextual factors affect prison admission rates, net of state level correctional contexts? In other words, is variation in local area prison admission rates completely explained by state-level factors (e.g., driven by the size of the state correctional population), or do metropolitan labor market and political contextual variables have independent effects on prison admission rates, net of state level factors?

Study Two

The above review demonstrates that increasing overall and race-specific incarceration rates co-occurred with deteriorating labor market (e.g., deindustrialization) and socioeconomic conditions for unskilled workers, and unskilled African Americans, in particular. Scholars argue that historical discrimination and labor market shifts (i.e., deindustrialization) resulted in concentrated disadvantage within some inner-city African American neighborhoods (e.g., Wilson 1978, 1987, 2009). Arguably, concentrated disadvantage (and the appearance of social disorder that is often closely associated) may lead to economic threat becoming linked to African Americans, and thus, increasing the formal social control of this group and others living in proximity (e.g., Wilson 1978, 1987, 2009).

To date, no study has examined the effects of local labor market and race-specific socioeconomic contextual variables on race-disaggregated prison admission rates. The second study in this project extends existing research by drawing (primarily) on the works of Wilson (1978, 2009) and Western (2006). From these works, this study derives the following questions:

1) First, is race-specific concentrated disadvantage (e.g., for African Americans and Whites) associated with prison admission rates? In other words, is concentrated disadvantage <u>within</u> local African American populations associated with increased use of (formal) criminal justice system control?

2) Are restricted blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated with increased (formal) criminal justice system control?

3) Given Wilson's (1978) seminal work, are restricted blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated greater increases in prison admission rates for African Americans compared to Whites?

Similarly, given Western's (2006: 75) argument that disparity in prison admission rates by skill and within race is greater than the disparity Black-White prison admission rates, this project asks the following questions:

1) Is the percentage of workers without college education among African Americans and Whites associated with prison admission rates? Specifically, are overall concentrations of unskilled workers in the labor market and concentrations of unskilled workers <u>among</u> Blacks associated with prison admission rates?

2) Do the effects of overall and race-specific rates of workers without college education fully explain prison admission rates by race (i.e., when examining race-

disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas) and do the effects of these variables differ across race?

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the theoretical and empirical background to formulate research questions for the two empirical studies comprising this dissertation. The following chapter discusses the procedures used to link and compile the data sources, as well as the statistical techniques utilized in each study. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of Study One and Study Two, respectively.

CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS

<u>Introduction</u>

As discussed in Chapter 1, there is no one dataset that includes all of the

necessary information needed to examine the research questions of this project. This

chapter discusses the methodology used to compile a dataset for this purpose. The

structure of this chapter is as follows. First, this chapter lists and describes the data

sources utilized and provides a rationale for their use in this project. Second, this chapter

describes the procedures used to link data sources within a common geographical

boundary (Census Public Use Micro Areas or PUMAs). Third, this chapter discusses

characteristics of the sample and operational definitions for variables used for the two

empirical analyses of this project. Finally, this chapter discusses the statistical techniques

utilized in each analysis.

<u>The Data</u>

To evaluate the effects of local economic and labor market conditions on prison

admission rates, this project combines data from two primary sources: the National

Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice

Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Corrections Reporting Program) (1989

and 1999), and Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data (1990 and 2000)

(Ruggles et al. 2010). In addition, NCRP and IPUMS are linked with two general election

studies. The source of election data for the year 1990 originates in files in the dataset,

"General Election Data for the United States," which is available in Inter-university

Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archives (Inter-university

Consortium for Political and Social Research 1995). The source of election data for the

year 2000 originates in files made publically available by American University's Federal

Elections Project (Lublin and Voss 2001). These data are also combined with files

containing information on local crime from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (U.S.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999) and

state-level criminal justice system and political characteristics *The Book of the States*

(1990 and 2000). The unit of analysis for this project is local areas, as defined by Census

Public Use Micro Area (PUMA) boundaries (Ruggles et al. 2010). A complete list of data

sources is available in Table 3-1.

National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data originate from prisoner

records, which are collected by regional criminal justice personnel and compiled by the

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice

Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Corrections Reporting Program 1989 and

1999). These data include annual (1983 – 2003) individual record data on incarceration

history, offense at time of sentencing, total prison time served, basic prisoner background

information, and the county in which prisoners received their longest sentences. While

NCRP data are available beginning 1983, this project uses only data for the period 1990 –

2000. This maximizes the sample available over time, as 5% IPUM samples are available

only in decennial years, and fewer states reported to NCRP during the 1980s.

Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data originate from decennial

Census and Current Population Survey (CPS) data and contain detailed individual-level

labor market, economic and socio-demographic information. This project utilizes

decennial 5% IPUM samples (1990 and 2000), as these files contain the largest number

of individual cases. In addition, IPUMS includes "harmonized" variables, which are

designed by analysts at the Minnesota Population Center to account for measurement differences across decennial Census years (e.g., race, occupation and industry classifications) (Ruggles et al. 2010). This project utilizes harmonized variables whenever possible to reduce the possibility of a break in series. Further, both IPUMS and NCRP are micro-data. This is advantageous for this project because it allows for the creation of more specific measures of labor market and economic indicators as well as local-level prison admission rates than have been previously examined in the literature.

As the majority of policy-making occurs at the state level, this project includes state-level measures of political context. This information is available from *The Book of the States* (1990 and 2000). As political partisanship varies across smaller geographical areas, I include a measure of local support for Republican candidates in the most recent general election years. As noted earlier in this chapter, local political partisanship data are compiled from two sources. Data for the year 1990 originate from the dataset, "General Election Data for the United States" (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 1995). Data for the year 2000 originate from the dataset, Federal Elections Project data from American University's Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies (Lublin and Voss 2001).

Because crime should be associated with imprisonment and this project examines the effects of social processes on imprisonment beyond that of local crime rates, empirical analyses for rates of local area serious felonies known to police. These data originate from Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest data files (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999), which include monthly data on the number of serious crimes reported to law

enforcement agencies, as well as the number of said crimes that were cleared by arrest or other means.

The Sample

The current sample is comprised of 403 large metropolitan areas (Census PUMAs) over two decades. Because area-identified Census micro-data (such as IPUMS) are only available during decennial Census years before 2005, the current analysis examines two time points (1990 and 2000). This project uses NCRP years 1989 and 1999 to maximize sample size, given the number of states reporting in those years.

The unit of analysis for this project is the most disaggregated geographical unit publicly available: Census Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs). Measuring local labor market and economic conditions at this level is advantageous for several reasons. First, labor market opportunities and economic conditions transcend county borders. Census PUMAs are constructed to better reflect the ways that local populations understand local economies, and are often comprised of multiple counties. Second, PUMAs provide a nationally-representative sample of large metropolitan labor markets (i.e., areas with a population of 100,000 or more). This allows for analysis of variation in local economic conditions and imprisonment across large labor market areas (i.e., to capture deindustrialization). Third, some county boundaries changed over time. PUMA boundary files account for these changes and are designed to be directly comparable across years (Ruggles et al. 2010). This provides a large, reliable, and nationally-representative sample of local labor market areas (N= 543) to which local prison admission rates can be matched.

More specifically, these boundaries are defined using IPUMS Consistent Public Use Micro Data Areas (CONSPUMAs). This geographical unit was created by the Minnesota Population Center to combine Census Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs in 1990 and 2000) and County Groups (in 1980) to produce a unit of geography that is directly comparable over time (1980 – 2000) (Ruggles et al. 2010). As this project analyses imprisonment rates in 1990 and 2000, the acronym 'PUMA' is used because this is the boundary name for these areas in 1990 and 2000.[12]

The specific steps taken to create the dataset are as follows. PUMA boundary files identify the specific counties comprising each PUMA in each decade; these files include Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) codes that facilitate merging IPUMS and county-level data.   First, dichotomous indicators are created for variables of interest (e.g., unskilled blue collar employment) in IPUMS micro-data for each time point (1990 and 2000). These indicators are then aggregated within PUMAs and appropriate sampling weights are applied.[13] As noted earlier, this project utilizes 5% weighted IPUM samples (for 1990 and 2000). These files are designed to be used in combination with sampling weight variables in order to obtain nationally-representative statistics (Ruggles et al.

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[12] The areas comprising PUMAs changed over time. IPUMS researchers created "CONSPUMA" boundaries to be consistent from 1980 – 2000. Because the analysis is over two time points (1990 and 2000), I elect to use CONSPUMA as the unit of geography. The following explanation is per an email conversation with an IPUMS staff member: However, while CONSPUMAs consistently identify the smallest possible areas, in some cases these areas are quite large. For example, some of the PUMA boundaries in the 1990 5% state sample differed so significantly from the PUMA boundaries in the 2000 5% sample in North Dakota that the smallest geographic area that can consistently be identified is the entire state. Given this, I estimate sensitivity analyses and find that the substantive effects remain unchanged upon deletion of these large areas.

[13] I use the "collapse" command and adjust by the appropriate sample weights (provided by Ruggles et al. 2010) in Stata12.

2010).[14] In addition, IPUMS data contain both person- and household-level variables. Person-level variables (e.g., employment status) are adjusted by the person weight variable provided by IPUMS. Household-level variables are created by first selecting a single individual to represent that household (e.g., head of household) and then adjusting by the household weight variable provided by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010).

Second, dichotomous indicator variables of the variety above (e.g., prison admission) are created in NCRP for each time point. NCRP prison admission rates are next aggregated within counties. These files are then linked with the respective PUMA boundary files (by year). After identifying the counties comprising each PUMA, prison admission counts from NCRP are aggregated within PUMAs.

Third, PUMA-aggregated NCRP files are linked to the files containing custom indicators of local labor market, economic and socio-demographic variables created (as described, above) utilizing IPUMS data. All count variables are then by local area population estimates from IPUMS. For example, to calculate the rate of (overall) local prison admission rates, total local counts of individuals admitted to prison are adjusted by local adult populations of the respective areas.[15] Rates for other variables are created in a similar fashion. Populations used to create rate variables are discussed in greater detail at a later point in this chapter. Please refer to the section under the sub-heading, "Variable Creation."

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[14] Specifically, sampling weight variables indicate the number of persons or households in the U.S. population that are represented by a given individual or household in an IPUMS sample.

[15] These counts are adjusted by the local adult population, as counts of prison admission rates are calculated for adults only. Similarly, rates of race-specific prison admission rates (for Whites and African Americans) are calculated using prison admission counts for each group, adjusted by the respective (race-specific) local adult population.

Fourth, files created for each year (1990 and 2000) are combined into a single

dataset, which now includes information for local areas at both time points and these data

are matched with data files containing state and local level political partisanship

measures, as well as crime and criminal justice system characteristics (1990 and 2000).

State-level political partisanship and criminal justice measures are matched to local area

files (by state FIPS code and year). Other sources of local level (PUMA-aggregated) data

are linked in a similar manner (as discussed, above).

More specifically, to link local political partisanship data, the total number of

votes for Republicans (for each year) are aggregated within PUMAs and adjusted by the

total number of votes cast in general election years within the corresponding geographical

areas. In the datasets utilized by this project (Inter-university Consortium for Political and

Social Research 1995 and Lublin and Voss 2001), local election returns are reported

within counties. In a similar manner as described earlier in this chapter, counties are

linked to PUMA boundaries by matching five-digit Federal Information Processing

Standard (FIPS) codes. This is accomplished using Census boundary files (Ruggles et al.

2010). The percentage of votes for Republican presidential candidates is calculated the

number of votes for this party within PUMAs and adjusting by the total number of votes

cast in the respective election within the corresponding geographical unit. For

consistency in estimates, this project utilizes data from general election years only, as the

timing of elections for state offices (e.g., gubernatorial elections) may vary (i.e., do not

occur during the same year for every state).

Finally, files containing information on local area serious felonies known to

police are linked to the combined file (created in the steps, above). Specifically, serious

felonies known to police (Part I Index offenses) are reported at the agency level (U.S.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999). This

project links Uniform Crime Report (UCR) agency (or "ORI") codes to five-digit Federal

Information Processing Standard (FIPS) codes utilizing a "crosswalk" designed for this

purpose (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 2005). County-aggregated serious

felonies are then linked to local area boundaries (PUMAs), utilizing Census boundary

files (Ruggles et al. 2010). The rate of local serious felonies known to police is

calculated by adjusting PUMA-aggregated two-year averages of serious felonies known

to police (Part I Index offenses) offenses by local area UCR population.[16] The total local

(PUMA) UCR population is calculated by aggregating and linking the total coverage (or,

UCR population, as reported in U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999) within PUMAs in a similar manner as discussed,

above.

<center>Missing Data</center>

All of the information in the foregoing discussion is not available for all 543

Census PUMAs at this time. As noted earlier in this chapter, the current sample is

comprised of 403 large metropolitan areas (Census PUMAs) over two decades. Missing

cases originate from three sources, which are discussed below.

First, not all areas included in PUMA boundary files (Ruggles et al. 2010) report

prisoner statistics to NCRP. A limitation of NCRP data is that not all states contribute

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[16] Local law enforcement agencies report crime statistics to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI publishes this information in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Part I UCR Index offenses include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson.

data to the BJS collection. Specifically, a total of 34 states reported to NCRP in 1989 and 1999. [17] The areas included in the current sample are those that report in both 1989 and 1999. Remaining counties are matched to PUMA boundaries (linked via five-digit FIPS codes). This reduced the sample (from the 543 total PUMAs available in IPUMS) to 403. Please refer to Table A-1 (Appendix), which lists missing data by variable.

Second, crime data are not available for all 543 PUMAs. Participation in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program is voluntary. A limitation of UCR data is that not all law enforcement agencies in the U.S. contribute data on crimes within their jurisdiction to the FBI. Fifty eight local areas (PUMAs) are excluded from the analysis due to missing UCR data.

Third, local political partisanship data are not available for all 543 PUMAs. Specifically, sixteen local areas are not included in local political partisanship data. Thirteen of these cases are missing in the year 1990 (ICPSR 1995), and three are missing in the year 2000 (Lublin and Voss 2001). Three of the local areas missing political partisanship data are also missing in UCR statistics.

In sum, NCRP data (1989 and 1999) are utilized to create the PUMA-level rates of incarceration; these are matched with contemporaneous measures of local economic and socio-demographic characteristics across Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs) (1990 – 2000), as well as state- and local- (PUMA) level political data in decennial years (1990 – 2000). The specific variables used for each empirical analysis are described below. Tables 3-2 and 3-3 provide a complete list of operational definitions for each empirical

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[17] States that <u>did not</u> report during sample years (1989 and 1999) include Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.

analysis chapter. Tables of descriptive statistics and variable correlations (for each respective analysis) will follow in Chapters 4 and 5.

Variable Creation

Dependent Variables

As noted previously in this chapter, local rates of prison admission are created by aggregating total and race-disaggregated prison admission rates within local areas (PUMAS), and adjusting by the respective local (PUMA) adult population. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Study One examines the effects of local labor market and political context on overall local prison admission rates. The outcome variable for this analysis is prison admission rates (logged). Study Two examines the effects of race-specific socioeconomic and labor market contextual variables on prison admission rates for Whites and African Americans. Thus, the outcome variables for my second empirical chapter are race-disaggregated, logged prison admission rates (African American and White).

This project does not estimate Latino prison admission rates at this time due to data limitations in NCRP data. It would be ideal to create a separate category of prison admission rates for persons of Latino ethnicity and to examine the imprisonment experiences of this group vis-à-vis Whites and African Americans. However, due to variation across states in reporting inmate ethnicity, it not possible to consistently disaggregate persons of Latino ethnicity over time. For example, some states do not

report Latino ethnicity, and some others report only Mexican Americans in these counts.[18] Given this, rates of prison admission for Whites may include some Latinos.

<div align="center">Independent Variables: Study One</div>

As noted previously in this chapter, Study One examines the effects of local labor market and political contextual variables on prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical areas. Measures of economic inequality used in this analysis are calculated by aggregating Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data within local areas (PUMAs). IPUMS data are important for the current research agenda, as they allow for more precise measurement of labor market indicators. Except where noted, these indicators are measured as percentages of adult (18 – 64) non-institutionalized local population. Specifically, measures of labor market context include the following: concentration of unskilled workers in the local labor market; the percent of workers without college education among men; concentration of unskilled workers employed in selected blue-collar industries; and the overall percentage of unemployment. [19]

Given Western's (2006) findings that rates of prison admission for unskilled men have increased, this project includes a measure of the percent of workers without college education among men.[20] In addition, because this project proposes that labor market conditions for unskilled workers (and unskilled men, in particular) affect prison

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[18] States where Latino ethnicity is <u>not reported</u> include Iowa, Louisiana, and Maryland. Similarly, Pennsylvania (not in sample) treats Latino as a race category, and "White" includes some Latinos. Sates that include <u>only</u> Mexicans include California, Michigan, and Oklahoma.

[19] For this project, "unskilled" is defined as able-bodied, non-student adults (18-64) with less than four years college education.

[20] The local number of men who are unskilled, adjusted by the total local adult male population.

admission rates in the corresponding geographical areas, the present study includes a

measure of the concentration of unskilled workers employed in blue collar industries.[21]

Specifically, this measure is created by aggregating IPUMs micro-data to create local

rates of unskilled employment in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining,

fishing and forestry industries. This particular group of industries is examined because,

historically, these industries often provide relatively high paying employment

opportunities for workers without college educations.

This project utilizes this operational definition of unskilled blue collar

employment for two primary reasons. First, the use of a custom indicator allows for an

examination of a more targeted range of employment outcomes than what is often

utilized when analyzing aggregate Census data. Examining aggregate rates of

employment across industries may mask important variation within a particular industry.

This project moves beyond this limitation by excluding "lower quality" blue collar jobs

(e.g., meat packing workers and taxi drivers), as contemporary opportunities in these

fields more closely resemble low-skilled service sector jobs, with regard to earnings,

benefits and other characteristics. In addition, employment rates are calculated for

workers between the ages of 18-64 (instead of the traditional "working-age" population,

16-64), as rates of prison admission are for adults only. Second, broadly defining

unskilled blue collar is advantageous for this analysis in that it may be used to examine

the effects of blue collar employment across a wider variety of geographical regions. For

example, including employment in forestry and construction ensures that the analysis is

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[21] The total number of adult unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, adjusted by the total number of adult unskilled workers in the local labor force.

not limited to "rust-belt" areas, which would be the case if only manufacturing employment was examined. Additionally, Study One controls for the percent of the local population that is unemployed.

To examine the political context associated with rising prison admission rates this project creates measures of state and local political partisanship. As the majority of policy-making occurs at the state level, this project includes state-level measures of political context. To this end, Study One includes a state-level indicator for a currently seated Republican governor. In addition, this analysis includes a measure of local area (PUMA) political partisanship. This is measured as the percentage of the local area (PUMA) voting for Republican political candidates (of the total number of votes cast in the respective election) in the most recent general election year.

<div align="center">Independent Variables: Study Two</div>

As discussed previously in this chapter, Study Two examines the effects of labor market opportunities and race-specific concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage on rates of prison admission rates for African Americans and Whites. Following the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2, this project argues that the consideration of race-specific labor market and economic indicators may be a more fruitful avenue for research than examining the effects of minority group population size, as the perceived "threat" tied to these groups may be linked with patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage within these groups. Thus, this project utilizes variables designed to capture economic threat that may be tied African Americans, such as measures of race-specific socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage. These variables include: the percent of African American households receiving public assistance; the percent of White

households with income at or below the poverty line; the percent of African American

men who are idle,[22] (following Wilson's (1978, 2009) discussion of concentrated

disadvantage in African American communities); and the percent of Whites who are

unemployed following research in the *economic threat* tradition (e.g., Jankovic 1977;

Quinney 1977; Box and Hale 1982; Melossi 1985; Myers and Sabol 1987; Lynch 1988).

However, prior research in criminology, finds that macro-level indicators of

disadvantage are often concentrated within local areas and may be highly collinear (e.g.,

Land, McCall and Cohen 1990). For this reason, this project extracts two single standard

principal components of indicators of disadvantage. These are created to capture the

within-race concentration of disadvantage for African Americans and Whites.

Following Wacquant (2010) and Wilson (2009), this project proposes that images

of Black poverty are often those of licentious "welfare queens" and idle Black males.

Although the percentage of households receiving public assistance is highly correlated

with the percent of these households at or below the poverty level (which is used in the

measure of White disadvantage, below), Study Two examines rates of households

receiving welfare provisions (for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and

its successor, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), only), specifically, due

to the underlying political discourse that is often associated with impoverished African

American households. These variables are used to extract a single standard principal

component of African American disadvantage. This variable includes the percentage of

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[22] Able-bodied, non-student adult males who are unemployed or not in the labor force.

African American households receiving public assistance and the percentage of "idle" African American males.[23] Factor loadings are .70 for each variable included.

Discussions of White idleness and White "welfare queens" are uncommon in the empirical literature. Instead, this project elects to use more traditional measures of to capture economic hardship among the White population. Thus, I extract a single standard principal component of White disadvantage that includes the percentage of White households at or below the poverty threshold and the percentage of Whites who are unemployed.[24] Factor loadings are .70 for each variable included.

Western (2006) finds that prison admission rates increased disproportionately for unskilled workers. For these reasons, Study Two includes a measure of the concentration of unskilled labor within local labor markets, measured as the percentage of the local adult (age 18-64) labor force that is unskilled, of the total local adult non-institutionalized labor force. Additionally, Western (2006) finds that within-race skill differences in prison admission rates are greater than the disparity in Black-White prison admission rates. Thus, Study Two includes a measure of the percent of workers without college education among African Americans.[25]

Similarly, given Wilson's (1978) historical analysis, restricted blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers may provide a labor market context associated with concentrated disadvantage for African Americans. In sum, concentrated may lead to

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[23] The total number of adult, able-bodied, non-student males who are unemployed or not in the labor force, adjusted by the total number of able-bodied, adult African American males (18-64).

[24] Patterns of significance are unchanged in sensitivity analyses using factor variables comprised of identical (but race-specific) variables.

[25] The percent of adult African Americans who are unskilled, of the total local adult African American population

perceptions of economic threat becoming linked to African Americans; thus, further

linking African Americans with economic threat (*racialized economic threat*). Following

this logic, Study Two examines the effects of percentage of unskilled workers employed

in blue collar industries on prison admission rates for African Americans and Whites. [26]

Control Variables

Although this project argues that race-specific socioeconomic indicators are a

more fruitful avenue for research than analyses of minority group population size, the

analyses of this project control for the percent of the local population that is African

American and the local percent of the population that is Latino.

In addition, the present analyses include population controls (in millions) for local

areas (PUMAs). Arguably, imprisonment rates are influenced by state-level factors. For

example, it is possible that variation in local prison admission rates is primarily driven by

state correctional policies; thus, states that imprison proportionally more of their citizens

would be expected to also have higher local prison admission rates. Given this, the

present analyses include controls for state imprisonment rates.[27]

Because crime should be associated with imprisonment and this project examines

the effects of social processes beyond that of local crime rates, controls for crimes known

to local police are included. This project is not about crime, of course, but rather about

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[26] As noted earlier, this is measured as the total number of adult unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, adjusted by the total number of adult unskilled workers in the local labor force.

[27] Although not included in final models, I estimate models controlling for a number of other factors at the state level, including overall and violent crime rates, state unemployment rates, income inequality (as GINI coefficient), state poverty, and state African American population, and find that the substantive effects/directions of the causal variables in each analysis remain unchanged.

imprisonment, as this is a major source of state control (i.e., in keeping with the view that the state uses criminal punishment to solve problems of social order).

<div align="center">Statistical Analyses</div>

This dissertation examines prison admission rates at two points in time. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, prison admission rates increased during this time period (e.g., Beck and Harrison 2001). Second, this longitudinal design allows for the control of unobserved heterogeneity or time-invariant unmeasured idiosyncratic features of local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates. [28] In other words, this allows for the control other important, but unmeasured, time-invariant characteristics of local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates. Two statistical techniques are utilized: first difference regression (Study 1) and seemingly unrelated regression (Study 2) models. I conduct thorough analyses of residuals. A detailed discussion of each analysis is presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

To investigate the effects of labor markets and political contexts on local prison admission rates (Study 1), I estimate first differenced regression models. My variables are differenced across two time points (2000 – 1990) within local areas (PUMAs) to capture unobserved heterogeneity across these areas. I weight the data by local area (PUMA) population (Study 1) and by the respective racial group population size (Study 2) to account for the tendency of smaller population areas to have greater fluctuations in prison admission rates due to smaller denominators. This is especially important for Study Two,

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[28] For example, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has been regarded by some as having a history of discriminatory behavior toward African Americans (e.g., Reese 2005). Agency practices such as these may, in turn, result in higher prison admission rates for African Americans in corresponding areas. The current design allows me to control for such a possibility.

for example, as it allows for the control of the possibility that areas with small African American populations may have undue influence on the results due to greater fluctuations in the respective prison admission rates.

Study One uses the REG procedure in Stata and uses empirically adjusted standard errors to control for potential heteroskedasticity. Three hundred thirty two data points remain in Study One after differencing and deleting missing cases (N= 332).[29] Study Two uses the SUREG procedure in Stata. After differencing and deleting missing cases, 345 observations remain in Study Two (N=345).

Because it is likely that there is an association between the error terms in models predicting African American and White prison admission rates in the same geographical Study Two utilizes seemingly unrelated regression to fit both models simultaneously. As the current sample is comprised of a large number of local areas and two time points, this seemingly unrelated regression model utilizes first differenced variables. These variables are weighted by the respective racial group population size.[30]

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the procedures used to link, compile and create variables from the data sources utilized by this project, as well as the statistical techniques employed in empirical analyses. These statistical procedures are discussed in more detail

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[29] Missing UCR and local elections data reduce the sample for this analysis to 332 (N=332). Study 2 does not include elections data, thus, its sample size is slightly larger (N=445).

[30] Seemingly unrelated regression models in Stata do not allow for different weights across equations. To weight each model differently requires that all variables are adjusted accordingly. Specifically, each differenced variable is multiplied by the square root of the respective group population in each equation. In addition, an intercept variable that is equal to the square root of the respective group population and suppress the constant term (i.e., the 'nocons' option in Stata) is added.

in Chapters 4 and 5. The following chapter presents results from Study One, which

examines the effects of labor market and political contextual variables on (overall) prison

admission rates across local areas.

Table 3-1: Data Sources and Years of Analysis

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Source	Year(s)
Dependent Variables	Total and Race-Disaggregated Prison Admission Rates (logged)		National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), restricted access available via ICPSR (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/).	1989 and 1999
Independent Variables				
Local Labor Market Context	Educational Inequalities, Unskilled Blue Collar Employment, Percent Unemployed		Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS), publicly available via Minnesota Population Center (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/).	1990 and 2000
Local Racial threat	Percent African American, Percent Latino, African American Households receiving Assistance, African American Idleness, White Households in Poverty, White Unemployment		Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS), publicly available via Minnesota Population Center (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/).	1990 and 2000

Table 3-1   **(Cont.)**

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Source	Year(s)
Local Political Context	Percent Voting Republican		"General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990," principal investigator ICPSR (1995). Publicly available via ICPSR http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/).	1990
	Percent Voting Republican		"Federal Elections Project," principal investigators Lublin and Voss (2001). Publicly available via American University, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies (http://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/Data-Sets.cfm).	2000
State Political Context		Republican Governor	The Book of the States.	1990 and 2000
		Years Republican Governor held office since 1970	The Book of the States.	1990 and 2000
Local Population Control	Local Population (millions)		Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS), publicly available via Minnesota Population Center (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/).	1990 and 2000
Crime and Criminal Justice Controls	Local Crimes known to Police (logged)		"Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest," U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Publicly available via ICPSR (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/).	1988, 1990, 1998 and 1999
		Percent State Imprisonment	The Book of the States.	1990 and 2000

Table 3-2: Dependent and Independent Variables: Study 1

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Description
Dependent Variable	Prison Admission Rate (logged)		Number of admitted prisoners, aggregated within PUMAs and adjusted by local area adult population.
Independent Variables			
Labor Market Context	Percent Unskilled Men		Percent of men with less than 4-years college education, adjusted by the local adult male population.
	Percent Unskilled Blue-Collar Employment		Percent of unskilled workers employed in blue-collar positions (as number of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, adjusted by the total number of unskilled workers, age 18-64 (per 1,000 of the local population)).
	Percent Unemployed		Percent of civilian non-institutionalized unemployed workers (as number of unemployed workers adjusted by the total local civilian labor force, age 16 - 64).
Minority Group Threat	Percent African American		Percent African Americans of total local population.
	Percent Latino		Percent Latinos of total local population.
Political Context	Percent Voting Republican		Percent of local area voting Republican in the most recent presidential election (as the number of votes for the Republican presidential candidate, adjusted by the total number of votes in the respective election).
		Republican Governor	0, 1 indicator for presence of a currently-seated Republican governor.

Table 3-2   (Cont.)

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Description
Local Population Control	Local Population (millions)		Total county population aggregated within PUMA.
Crime and Criminal Justice Controls	Local Crimes known to Police (logged)		Total number of serious felonies known to police (UCR Return A, Part I Index Offenses), aggregated within PUMA and adjusted by UCR population (per 1,000 local population).
		Percent State Imprisonment	Total number incarcerated in state prison, adjusted by state population.

Table 3-3: Dependent and Independent Variables: Study 2

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Description
Dependent Variables	African American Prison Admission Rate		Number of admitted prisoners who are African American, aggregated within PUMA and adjusted by local area adult African American population (logged).
	White Prison Admission Rate		Number of admitted prisoners who are White, aggregated within PUMA and adjusted by local area adult White population (logged).
Independent Variables			
Racial Threat	% African American		Percent of the local population that is African American.
	% Latino		Percent of the local population that is Latino.
Racialized Economic Threat	African American Socioeconomic/ Labor Market Disadvantage		Standard principal component of the percent of African American households receiving public assistance (of the total number of African American households) and the percent of African American men who are jobless (the number of able-bodied, adult, non-student African American men who are unemployed or not in the labor force, of the total number of adult African American men).
	White Socioeconomic/ Labor Market Disadvantage		Standard principal component of the percent of White households at or below the poverty threshold (of the total number of White households) and the percent of Whites who are jobless (the number of able-bodied, adult, non-student White men who are unemployed or not in the labor force, of the total number of adult White men).
	% Unskilled African Americans		Percent of African Americans with less than 4-years college education, adjusted by the local adult African American population

Table 3-3　　　(Cont.)

Variable Type	Local/ PUMA	State	Description
	% Unskilled Blue-Collar Employment		Percent of unskilled workers employed in blue-collar positions (as number of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, adjusted by the total number of unskilled workers, age 18-64).
Control Variables	Local Population		Total local area/PUMA population (in millions).
Crime and Criminal Justice Controls	Local Crimes known to Police (logged)		Total number of serious felonies known to police (UCR Return A, Part I Index Offenses), aggregated within PUMA and adjusted by the respective UCR population (per 1,000 of local population).
		% State Imprisonment	Total number incarcerated in state prison, adjusted by state population.

CHAPTER 4. THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
OF PRISON ADMISSION RATES

As Chapter 2 demonstrates, there are reasons to examine the co-occurrence of

rising imprisonment during a period of labor market restructuring. Imprisonment rates

increased during a time period where technological advancements and the decline of

manufacturing production in urban areas eliminated many high-quality collar job

opportunities for unskilled workers (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson 2000; Wright

and Dwyer 2003). This raises the question of whether restricted opportunities for

unskilled workers reduce labor market social control for these groups. It is unknown

whether specific labor market shifts (e.g., the percent of workers without college

education and restricted blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers)

influence imprisonment rates.

In addition, policies targeting the poor population (such as criminal justice

policies) since the 1970s became more punitive with the resurgence of Republican Party

popularity and overall imprisonment rates subsequently increased (e.g., Beckett 1997;

Garland 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004).   No research has

investigated the effects of economic and labor market shifts in combination with partisan

political movements that redefined and fundamentally shifted policies targeting

marginalized populations that are disproportionately subject to control through the

criminal justice system.

The Local Labor Market Context of Imprisonment

Unlike the traditional (blue collar) "working class" of earlier decades, unskilled

workers are now less likely to receive the benefits of full social citizenship and social

integration that regular, high-paying employment provides, nor are they subject to the

same form of social control-producing economic organization (e.g., within the constraints of a factory) (e.g., Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006; Wacquant 2010). As discussed in Chapter 2, this presents new challenges for social order and requires moving beyond the Rusche and Kirshheimer ([1939] 1968) framework. In sum, this project argues that the co-occurrence of deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates for this group suggests a possible connection.

Blue collar job opportunities for unskilled workers continued to decline since 1990 (e.g., Bound and Johnson 1995; Chevan and Stokes 2000; McCall 2000, 2001; Wright and Dwyer 2003; Albrecht and Albrecht 2009, 2010). For example, Figure 4-1 depicts the co-occurrence of unskilled blue collar employment decline and increasing prison admission rates for my sample of local areas (PUMAs) in 1990 and 2000. Specifically, rates of unskilled blue collar employment declined by 3% (on average) within local areas during this time period. [31]

In addition, some evidence suggests that rates of prison admission for unskilled men have increased (e.g., Western 2006: 27). The present study maintains that the labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates presents an important issue for research. However, as noted in Chapter 2, empirical works examining associations between labor markets and imprisonment have primarily focused on unemployment rates and examining official unemployment measures may be problematic, as these estimates do not include discouraged workers who are no longer looking for work (for a review, see Chiricos and Delone 1992). Official unemployment rates may not fully capture the economically marginalized population, especially given

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[31] This is the percentage of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, of the total local civilian labor force.

the diversity of outcomes for unskilled workers following deindustrialization (e.g., unemployment, idleness, part time/ temporary employment and lower-quality service positions) (e.g., Di Giorgi 2006). Studies to date have not examined the effects of restricted blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers on imprisonment rates.

Additionally, much of the existing research in this vein has been at the national and state levels and results at these levels of aggregation are inconsistent (please refer to Chapter 2 for a review of this literature). As noted in Chapter 2, the U.S. is a very large and decentralized nation. Labor market conditions vary considerably across smaller units of analysis (e.g., McCall 2001). Prison admission rates may also vary across local areas. For example, change in local prison admission rates across local areas (PUMAs) from 1990 to 2000 is depicted in Figure 4-2. Thus, it is possible that at least some of the inconsistencies in earlier studies may be due to important variation that is missed at higher units of aggregation.

Given the theoretical and empirical research examining the associations between labor market conditions and imprisonment rates, this chapter asks the following question:

- How are worker characteristics of local labor forces (i.e., concentration of men who are unskilled) and the types of opportunities available in metropolitan area labor markets (i.e., the availability of blue collar positions for unskilled workers) associated with prison admission rates? In other words, are the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted and blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated with the breakdown of (informal) labor market social control and subsequent (formal) criminal justice system control?

Based on the foregoing discussion, I generate the following hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1.a:** Local percent of workers without college education among men (i.e., the local concentration of adult males who are unskilled) will be positively associated with prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical areas.

- **Hypothesis 1.b:** Local blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers (i.e., the concentration of unskilled workers employed in blue collar industries) will be inversely associated with prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical areas.

<div align="center">The Political Context of Imprisonment</div>

As discussed in Chapter 2, the social control framework adopted here argues that a primary responsibility of the state is to provide social order (e.g., Garland 1990, 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Barker 2009). Ideally, social order or social control is rooted in social institutions, such as the economy, the labor market and the family (e.g., Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). However, there is often increased pressure on state managers to provide assurances of social order during times of social and economic insecurity. One way that this may be accomplished is through the use of the criminal justice system, which is used not only to control crime, but also (more symbolically) to provide assurances of social order to the public (e.g., Gaubatz 1995; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Garland 2001; Maruna 2004; Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2007; King and Maruna 2009; Costelloe et al 2009). In sum, the political context reflects the economic system of the society in which it arises (e.g., Chambliss and Seidman 1980; Garland 2001), and tougher

crime control policies are an avenue through which politicians may demonstrate policy success during times of social and economic uncertainty (e.g., Parenti 2000).

Additionally, evidence suggests that there are partisan differences in preferences for criminal justice control. Specifically, since the 1970s, Republican partisan political rhetoric has been more punitive than Democratic political rhetoric (e.g., Thorne 1990; Jacobs and Helms 1996, 2001, 2002; Beckett 1997; Feeley 2003; Smith 2004; Yates and Fording 2005; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Irwin 2005; Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2005; Western 2006; Spelman 2009). More specifically, as noted in Chapter 2, Republican Party policies most often serve the interests of the wealthy and candidates must find ways to appeal to working and middle class swing voters in order to become elected (e.g., Hibbs 1987; Allen and Campbell 1994; Bartels 2008). One of the ways that this may be accomplished is to appeal to fears of crime and to make their Democratic candidates appear "soft on crime" (e.g., Scheingold 1984, 1991; Beckett 1997; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Tonry 1999; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Chambliss 1994, 1999). Indeed, empirical research findings suggest that Republican leadership and support for the Republican Party increases overall imprisonment rates at the national (Jacobs and Helms 1996, 2001) and state level (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Davey 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Beckett and Western 2001; Western 2006; Smith 2004; Yates and Fording 2005; Spelman 2009).

As discussed in Chapter 2, many studies examine the association between political partisanship and imprisonment across U.S. states (please refer to Chapter 2 for a review of this literature). Political partisanship may vary across smaller geographical areas as well, and may be associated with prison admission rates. Much of what is

known about the effects of political partisanship on criminal justice outcomes across local areas is found in research on sentencing, and these results are inconsistent (e.g., Weidner and Frase 2003; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; Johnson 2006). At least some of the inconsistent findings of earlier studies may be because these local-level studies are not nationally-representative or longitudinal and cannot control for other important, but unmeasured time-invariant characteristics of local areas that may affect prison sentences.

Given the theoretical and empirical research examining the effects of Republican partisan support and political leadership on imprisonment rates, this project asks the following questions:

- Do partisan differences (i.e., Republican leadership and/or support for Republican candidates) across states and local areas influence imprisonment rates? In other words, given the tradition in the empirical research in this area, are state Republican leadership and/or local support for Republican political candidates associated with prison admission rates?

Based on the foregoing discussion, I generate the following hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 2.a**: Local support for Republican political candidates will be positively associated with prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical areas.

- **Hypothesis 2.b:** The presence of a currently seated Republican governor (at the state level) will be positively associated with prison admission rates across local areas located within said states.

<center>Variables</center>

<center>Dependent Variable</center>

The outcome variable in this study is logged prison admission rates.[32] As discussed in Chapter 3, prison admission rates are aggregated within local areas (PUMAs) and adjusted for local area adult population size. Chapter 3 includes a detailed list of data sources (see Table 3-1) and discussion of variable creation. Tables 3-2, 4-2 and 4-3 present variable definitions, descriptive statistics and correlations.

<center>Independent Variables</center>

This study focuses on whether characteristics of labor markets are associated with prison admission rates in those same areas. Thus, this project includes measures of the percent of workers without college education among men and the rate of unskilled employment in blue collar industries across local areas. Thus, the primary independent variables of interest are the percent of workers without college education among men and the rate of unskilled blue collar industries across local areas. I therefore include in my models a measure of the percent of workers without college education among men and a measure of unskilled blue collar employment in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries. [33] I also control for the percentage of the local population that is unemployed.

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[32] This is the rate of total prison admissions within local areas for all races and ethnicities.

[33] As discussed in Chapter 3, this particular group of industries is selected because, historically, they provide relatively higher-paying employment opportunities for workers without college educations. This measure does not include "lower quality" blue collar jobs (i.e., meat packing workers and taxi drivers), as contemporary opportunities in these fields are more similar to low-skilled service sector positions (e.g., with regard to rates of pay, benefits, etc…). Rates of employment in these industries are

To examine the effects of support for the Republican Party on prison admission rates at the local level, this project includes a measure of the percent of local area voting Republican in the most recent presidential election. [34] I also examine the association between Republican leadership and prison admission rates by including a variable to indicate whether there is a currently seated Republican governor.

Control Variables

I include a control variable for local population (PUMA) size (in millions). Imprisonment rates are clearly influenced by state-level factors because prisons are operated by states. It could be the case that local prison admission rates are primarily driven by state correctional policies; thus, states that imprison proportionally more of their citizens would be expected to also have higher local prison admission rates. Thus, this analysis controls for state imprisonment rates.[35]

Because crime should be associated with imprisonment and this project examines social processes beyond that of local crime rates, this analysis controls for the rate of serious felonies that are known to local police. This measure includes all UCR Part I Index offenses. This project is not about crime, of course, but rather about imprisonment, as this is a major source of state control (i.e., in keeping with the view that the state uses criminal punishment to solve problems of social order).

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created for unskilled adult workers (age 18-64), and are adjusted by the total local adult workforce (age 18-64), as rates of prison admission data in NCRP are available for adults only.

[34] The use of election returns to capture local political ideology (i.e., support for the Republican Party) is a common strategy (e.g., Helms and Costanza 2010).

[35] Although not included in final models, I estimate models controlling for a number of other factors at the state level, including overall and violent crime rates, state unemployment rates, income inequality (as GINI coefficient), state poverty rates, and state African American population, and find that the substantive effects/directions of the key independent variables in each analysis remain unchanged.

Following research in the *racial threat* tradition (e.g., Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967), I control for the percent of the local population that is African American. I also control for the percent of the local population that is Latino.[36]

<div align="center">Statistical Analysis</div>

As discussed in Chapter 3, I estimate first-differenced regression models to examine the effects of labor market and political contextual variables on local prison admission rates. I use empirically adjusted standard errors to control for potential heteroskedasticity. All variables are differenced across two time points (2000 – 1990) within local areas (PUMAs). This procedure captures time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across these areas. Thus, this longitudinal analysis is advantageous, in that it allows for the control of other important, but unmeasured, time-invariant characteristics of local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates. The data are weighted by local area (PUMA) population to account for the tendency of smaller population areas to have greater fluctuations in prison admission rates due to smaller denominators. I use the REG procedure in Stata. Three hundred thirty-two data points remain after differencing and deleting missing cases (N= 332).

Three models are estimated. The first model examines the effects of state and local control variables, as well as the effects of the percentage of the local population that is African American and the percentage of the local population that is Latino. The second model examines the effects of the percent of workers without college education among men (i.e., the concentration of unskilled workers among men) and unskilled blue collar

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[36] The focus of the current chapter is to examine the labor market and political context of prison admission rates. The following chapter of this project examines the racial threat perspective in detail.

employment (i.e., the concentration of unskilled workers employed in blue collar industries), net of controls. The third model examines the effects of local labor market and political contextual variables, net of controls.

I conduct a thorough analysis of residuals, and find no evidence of violations of constant-variance and normality assumptions. Additionally, I compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess potential multicollinearity for each model and find that no VIF exceeds 5, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in these models (e.g., Menard 1995). Further, I plot the dependent variable, along with the predicted values of X. Finally, I compute Cook's D statistics to examine the effects of influential cases on the models. I identify twelve influential cases ($D_i > 4/n$ or $D_i > .012$). The patterns of significance in my estimates do not change for upon the deletion of these cases. [37] Visual representations of model diagnostic plots are included in the Appendix.

<div align="center">Results</div>

The first model estimates the effects of the state and metropolitan area control variables. Results are presented in Tables 4-4, 4-5 and Figure 4-6. Of the control variables included in this model, state imprisonment is positively associated with local prison admission rates. Local prison admission rates appear to be affected by state-level correctional contexts, as expected. Local population and crimes known to police are not significantly associated with prison admission rates after accounting for other covariates. Surprisingly, neither the percentage of the local population that is African American nor

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[37] Influential observations included the following local areas: Fayetteville, AR, Memphis, TN, Atlanta, GA, Asheville, NC, Greensboro, NC, Durham, NC, Raleigh, NC, Fayetteville, NC, Jacksonville, NC, Hickory NC, Winston/Salem, NC, and Highpoint, NC. The concentration of influential cases in North Carolina may be due to anomalous reporting of prison admission rates to NCRP. However, excluding North Carolina from this analysis does not change the patterns of significance in my estimates.

the percentage of the local population that is Latino are not significant predictors of prison admission rates after accounting for other characteristics of state and local areas. The implications of this finding will be discussed in later in this chapter. For ease of interpretation of the remaining models, findings are presented for the most substantively important effect sizes (as additive incremental increase) and their 95% confidence intervals.

The second model estimates the effects of the percent of workers without college education among men and unskilled blue collar employment rates on local prison admission rates, net of controls. This is consistent with the results of Western's (2006, Chapter 3) state-level analysis. As predicted, the percent of workers without college education among men is positively associated with prison admission rates in the corresponding local areas. Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of unskilled workers among males is associated with a significant 5.9% (95% CI: 2.8% – 9.1%; p-value<.000) increase in prison admission rates at the local level, holding all else constant. In addition, the percent of unskilled workers employed in blue collar industries is inversely associated with prison admission rates, although the effect is not statistically significant (p-value<.076).

The third model estimates the effects of state and local (PUMA) labor market and political contextual variables, net of controls. Contrary to predictions, the presence of a currently seated Republican governor is not significant after accounting for the cumulative effects of Republican governorship over time. However, local support for Republican candidates is positively associated with prison admission rates in corresponding geographical areas. Specifically, a 5 percentage point increase in the

percentage of the local area (PUMA) voting for Republican presidential candidates is associated with a significant 3.7% (95% CI: 3.4% – 7.3%; p-value<.031) increase in prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical area. This finding is consistent with Weidner and Frase's (2003) county-level research, and suggests that local partisanship is, indeed, an important consideration in examining the effects of the political context of prison admission rates.

Interestingly, effects for the percent of workers without college education among men and blue collar employment rates remain (relatively) substantively unchanged. However, unskilled blue collar employment reaches statistical significance after the inclusion of political contextual variables. Apparently, political context exerts some suppressor effect. After the addition of political context variables, a 5 percentage point increase in the concentration of unskilled workers in this sector is associated with a significant 16.6% (95% CI: -29.0% – -2.1 %; p-value<.027) decrease in prison admission rates at the local level, holding all else constant. These findings are consistent with the argument of Wilson (1978, 2009) and Western's (2006, Chapter 3) empirical findings, and suggests that there are, indeed, connections between the percent of workers without college education among men, deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates across local areas.

As expected, the local unemployment rate fails to reach significance after accounting for causal variables and other characteristics of state and local areas (PUMAs). These findings are consistent arguments that unemployment may not fully capture the size of the economically marginalized population following post-industrial labor market shifts (e.g., Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006). These results

suggest that other indicators of local labor market conditions (e.g., the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted blue collar job opportunities for unskilled workers) may better predict the punitive response of the criminal justice system.

<u>Discussion</u>

This chapter examines the effects of labor market and political contextual factors on overall prison admission rates across local areas. The findings presented in this chapter support hypotheses 1.a and 1.b, which predict that the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted unskilled blue collar employment are positively associated with prison admission rates within the corresponding local areas. In addition, these findings are consistent with findings from Western's (2006, Chapter 3) bivariate analysis that disparity in men's prison admission rates is greatest across skill and suggests that there are, indeed, connections between the percent of workers without college education among men, deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates across local areas (PUMAs).

Interestingly, the local unemployment rate fails to reach significance after accounting for other independent variables and other characteristics of states and local areas. These findings are consistent with theoretical arguments of Di Giorgi (2006), Michaolowski and Carlson (1999) and others who argue that unemployment may not completely capture the labor market experiences of the post-industrial working class. In sum, these findings suggest that other characteristics of local workers and indicators of local labor market opportunities (e.g., the percent of workers without college education

among men and restricted blue collar job opportunities for unskilled workers) are better predictors of the punitive response of the criminal justice system.

Second, as discussed previously, much of the research examining political partisanship and imprisonment is at the national and state levels. Very few studies examine the effects of political partisanship across counties or local areas, and none examine these in combination with the local labor market contextual variables included in the present analysis. Consistent with hypothesis 2.a. as well as Weidner and Frase's (2003) county-level research, these results suggest that there is a positive association between the proportion of the local area voting Republican and prison admission rates in the corresponding areas, and that local partisanship is, indeed, an important consideration in examining the effects of the political context of prison admission rates.

Finally, the percentage of the local population that is African American and the percentage of the local population that is Latino fail to reach significance after accounting for other characteristics of state and local areas. These results are inconsistent with the predictions of the *racial threat* perspective, which predicts that the size of racial and ethnic minority group populations will be positively associated with imprisonment, as the perceived threat posed by said groups is greater when these populations are large and/or growing (e.g., Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, this project argues that the perceived threat tied to racial and ethnic minority groups may actually be capturing patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage between these groups, such that economic threat and labor market competition becomes "racialized," or linked to particular racial and/or ethnic minority groups.

Figure 4-1: Average Local Unskilled Blue Collar Employment and Prison Admission Rates, 1990 and 2000

Figure 4-2: Change in Local Area (PUMA) Prison Admission Rates, 2000 - 1990

Legend:
- 1.6% to 14.9%
- 0.7% to 1.5%
- 0.1% to 0.6%
- -36.8% to 0.09%
- No data

Note: Figure 4-2 depicts change in local (PUMA) prison admission rates (per 1,000 of the local population) for the years 2000 to 1990. Darker color indicates larger <u>increases</u> in local prison admission rates during this time period. Black areas are those that did not report to National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) collections in both years.

Table 4-1: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (Study 1) (N=332)

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Variance	Min	Max
Local Prison Admission Rate (per 1,000)	0.004	0.003	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.096
Local Population (millions)	0.494	0.233	0.699	0.488	0.100	5.828
Percent State Imprisonment	0.474	0.470	0.188	0.035	0.099	1.051
Local Crimes known to Police (per 10,000)	0.005	0.000	0.084	0.007	0.000	1.931
Local Percent Black	10.600	5.708	12.449	154.984	0.019	81.762
Local Percent Latino	7.459	2.544	12.465	155.388	0.060	88.063
Local Percent Unskilled Males	62.666	64.721	9.517	90.564	17.000	78.650
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment	22.766	22.129	8.413	70.777	3.812	57.011
Local Percent Unemployed	6.077	5.652	2.390	5.713	2.083	19.352
Currently Seated Republican Governor (indicator)	0.485	0.000	0.500	0.250	0	1
Local Percent Voting Republican	51.716	52.221	10.899	118.788	10.289	85.542

Table 4-2: Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Study 1) (N=332)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Local Prison Admission Rate (logged)	1.000										
Local Population (millions)	.158	1.000									
Percent State Imprisonment	.372	.133	1.000								
Local Crimes known to Police	.152	.183	.029	1.000							
Local Percent Black	.395	.131	.275	.268	1.000						
Local Percent Latino	.177	.220	.324	.202	-.098	1.000					
Local Percent Unskilled Males	.004	-.116	-.011	-.066	-.117	-.057	1.000				
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Empl.	-.234	-.172	-.175	-.266	-.508	-.191	.705	1.000			
Local Percent Unemployed	.135	.000	.059	.207	.061	.413	.410	.200	1.000		
Current Republican Governor (indicator)	.013	.042	.121	.009	-.048	.148	-.007	-.024	-.082	1.000	
Local Percent Voting Republican	-.092	-.090	.145	-.289	-.121	-.168	.240	.271	-.171	-.051	1.000

Table 4-3: Effect Sizes for Significant Covariates: Percentage Change in Local Area (PUMA) Prison Admission Rates, 2000 - 1990

Effect	Increase in Covariate	Estimated % Change	95% Confidence Interval		p value
			Lower	Upper	
Local Percent Unskilled Males [1]	1 percentage point increase	5.9%	2.8%	9.1%	0.000
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment [2]	5 percentage point increase	-16.6%	-29.0%	-2.1%	0.027
Local Percent Voting Republican [3]	5 percentage point increase	3.7%	3.4%	7.3%	0.031

Note: N=332. The column labeled "Increase in Covariate" gives the additive incremental change in the covariate that is associated with the percent change in prison admission rates.

[1] Of local adult male population.

[2] Percentage of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, of the total local civilian labor force.

[3] In most recent presidential election.

Table 4-4: Parameter Estimates for all Covariates from First-Differenced Weighted Least Squares Regression of Local Area (PUMA) Prison Admission Rates (logged), 2000 - 1990

Covariate	1	2	3
Local Population (millions)	-.307	-.242	-.317*
	(.175)	(.190)	(.149)
Percent State Imprisonment (per 1,000)	.815***	.823***	.588**
	(.211)	(.215)	(.188)
Local Crimes known to Police (per 10,000)[1]	-.090	-.098	-.118*
	(.073)	(.065)	(.057)
Local Percent Black	-.010	-.015	.001
	(.016)	(.016)	(.014)
Local Percent Latino	-.013	-.016	-.001
	(.015)	(.019)	(.015)
Local Percent Unskilled Males [2]	--	.053**	.057***
	--	(.016)	(.015)
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment [3]	--	-.033+	-.036*
	--	(.018)	(.016)
Local Percent Unemployed [4]	--	-.018	-.052
	--	(.048)	(.032)
Current Republican Governor (indicator) [5]	--	--	-.030
	--	--	(.044)
Local Percent Voting Republican [6]	--	--	.010*
	--	--	(.003)
Intercept	.132*	.098	-.092
	(.058)	(.086)	(.075)

Note: N=332. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

[1] Part 1 Index Offenses

[2] Of local adult male population.

[3] Percentage of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, of the total civilian labor force.

[4] Percentage of able-bodied, adult males without four year college degree, of corresponding local male population.

[5] Number of years a Republican governor has held state office since 1970.

[5] 1=Republican.

[6] In most recent presidential election..

Figure 4-3: Percentage Change in Local Area (PUMA) Prison Admission Rates, 2000 - 1990 (N=332)

CHAPTER 5. THE EFFECTS OF LABOR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND
RACIALIZED ECONOMIC THREAT ON PRISON ADMISSION RATES BY
RACE

Introduction

This chapter discusses the hypotheses examined in Study Two and presents the

results from this statistical analysis. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the risk of

incarceration is much greater for African Americans than Whites (e.g., Bonczar 2003;

Western 2006; Mauer 2006). Specifically, scholars note that by the year 2000, African

Americans were at least five times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites at the

national level (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western 2006; Uggen and Manza 2006). For example,

Figure 5-1 depicts the risk of prison admission by race using average local prison

admission rates for African Americans and Whites for the years 1990 and 2000.

Specifically, rates of prison admission in 1990 were 2,716 per 100,000 for Blacks

compared to 200 for Whites. This rate increased for both groups by the year 2000.

Specifically, rates of prison admission in this year were 3,118 per 100,000 for Blacks

compared to 269 for Whites. Similarly, Figure 5-2 depicts the average local rate ratio of

Black to White prison admission rates in 1990 and 2000. Specifically, the ratio of Black-

to-White prison admission rates was 11.6-to-1 in the year 1990 and 13.6-to-1 in 2000.

Disproportionate Risk of Imprisonment by Race

Although much evidence suggests that risk of incarceration is much greater for

African Americans as compared to Whites, there is scholarly debate regarding whether

racial disparity has grown as (overall) incarceration rates increased. Western (2006: 31)

finds that lifetime risk of incarceration nearly doubled for all men, regardless of race.

Interestingly, Western (2006: 31) finds that the majority of the increasing risk of

incarceration occurs among unskilled men. Thus, increased risk of imprisonment for African Americans may be rooted in racial educational inequalities.

An important question is: what social, economic and labor market shifts at the macro-level account for the disproportionate risk of incarceration for African Americans (compared to Whites) during this time-period? This project argues that risk of imprisonment is linked with deteriorating labor market (e.g., deindustrialization) and socioeconomic conditions for unskilled workers, and this was particularly detrimental for the economic situations of unskilled African Americans. Specifically, historical discrimination and labor market shifts (i.e., deindustrialization) resulted in concentrated disadvantage within many inner-city African American neighborhoods (e.g., Wilson 1979, 1987, 2009). Arguably, concentrated disadvantage (and the appearance of social disorder that is often closely associated) may lead to economic threat and labor market competition becoming linked to African Americans, and thus, increasing the formal social control of this group and others living in proximity.

Background

Punishment scholars have long argued that imprisonment rates are not simply reactive to changes in crime rates, but also respond to the size of racial and ethnic minority group populations. As noted in Chapter 2, this framework is similar to the *economic threat hypothesis*, which argues that imprisonment rates react to the perceived threat posed by large and/or growing populations of economically marginalized workers (e.g., Rusche and Kirchheimer [1939] 1968). In sum, racial threat explanations argue that penal practices respond to perceived political and economic threats to majority racial and

ethnic group interests posed by large and/or growing racial or ethnic minority populations (e.g., Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967).

However, much of the existing research as examined the effects of these associations on overall (rather than race-disaggregated) imprisonment rates. As Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) and Heimer and her colleagues (2012) argue, analyses of race-disaggregated rates are important, as examining overall rates cannot capture whether the effects of covariates apply to both groups. In addition, scholars argue that it is important to examine African American imprisonment rates vis-à-vis White imprisonment rates (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Heimer, Johnson, Lang, Rengifo and Stemen 2012).

Recent research by Jacobs and Keen (2009), attempts this, and examines racial imprisonment disparity in the count ratio of Black-to-White prisoners across U.S. states. However, their analysis fails to adjust for minority group population size, which may mask important variation across states with smaller African American populations, where Black-White imprisonment disparities may actually be greatest (e.g., Hawkins and Hardy 1989; Mauer and King 2007, Table 6). Further, as Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) and Heimer and her colleagues (2012) argue, measuring imprisonment disparity as a rate-ratio cannot reveal race-specific differences in the effects of covariates, only whether the effect varies significantly across race. The current study goes beyond these studies to examine the effects of labor market and race-specific socioeconomic contextual variables.

As noted in Chapter 2, a number of the studies in the foregoing discussion employ cross-sectional analyses (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson 1987; Yates 1997; Arvanites and Asher 1998). As discussed previously, cross-sectional analyses cannot control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of states

and local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates. Thus, this project utilizes longitudinal techniques, examining prison admission rates by race at two points in time (1990 and 2000).

Moreover, minority group populations and patterns of imprisonment by race may vary across smaller units of analysis. For example, the distribution of the African American population varies significantly across local areas and within states, as depicted in Figure 5-3. Similarly, increases in racial prison admission disparity also vary across local areas and within states, as depicted in Figure 5-4. Thus, this project argues that it is important to examine these associations at the local level, as higher units of aggregation may mask important variation.

Summary of Theoretical Mechanisms

While some evidence shows that states and local areas with larger African American populations, do, indeed, have higher (overall) imprisonment rates (e.g., Beckett and Western 2001; Yates and Fording 2005; Western 2006), it is clear that historical arrangements contribute to socially important racial and ethnic distinctions (e.g., patterns of inequality across race and ethnicity), which make racial and ethnic categories meaningful. Thus, labor and economic contextual factors should be considered in examining the association between minority group presence and criminal punishment.

It seems plausible that perceived threat tied to racial and ethnic minority groups may actually reflect patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage between groups. That is, following the work of William Julius Wilson (1978), perhaps threat is less about the absolute size (and/or growth) of racial and ethnic minority groups, and more broadly, the concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage within them.

Additionally, there is reason to suspect that restricted blue collar positions associated with deindustrialization and the shift toward a service-based economy contributed to concentrated disadvantage within inner-cities and was particularly detrimental to the economic situations of African Americans (e.g., Wilson 1978, 2009).

Specifically, as Wilson (1978) argues, historical discrimination and labor market shifts (i.e., deindustrialization) resulted in concentrated disadvantage within some inner-city African American neighborhoods. Consequently, this concentrated disadvantage (and the appearance of social disorder that is often closely associated) may lead to economic threat becoming linked to African Americans, and thus, increasing the formal social control of this group and others living in proximity. Consistent with this line of reasoning, the discourses surrounding poverty and crime are often racialized, such that prevailing cultural stereotypes applied here are of lawless, violent minority males in underclass ghettos (e.g., Waquant 2009).

Similarly, some evidence suggests that the criminal justice control of unskilled African Americans increased during the time period that labor conditions for unskilled workers deteriorated. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, prison admission rates for unskilled men rose significantly (but increased little among college-educated men) from the early 1980s to late 1990s (Western 2006: 27, 74). Further, the combination of racial and the percent of workers without college education is quite striking when comparing prison admission rates for African American and White high school dropouts. As Western (2006: 73-78) notes, 1 in 6 unskilled African American men were admitted to prison by the late 1990s, as compared to 1 in 29 of their White counterparts.

In short, it is reasonable to suspect that the economic situations of African Americans may be associated with criminal punishment. It may be the case, as suggested by works of Wilson (1978, 2009), Wacquant (2009) and others, that the association between race and criminal punishment occur because economic threat and fear of crime have become linked to impoverished racial minorities. I refer to this as the *racialized economic threat hypothesis.*

Summary of Hypotheses to be Assessed

The social control perspective adopted here argues that, in addition to minority group size, other race-specific economic and labor market indicators (e.g., idleness, race-specific concentrated disadvantage and the percent of workers without college education) may be associated with prison admission rates. Given historical racial inequalities and the pronounced negative effects of labor market declines on less-skilled minority groups (e.g., Wilson 1987; Tigges and Tootle 1993; Huffman and Cohen 2004; Dickerson 2007). This project argues that these associations should be examined in more detail and using more nuanced, race-specific labor market and economic indicators.

As discussed above, it is important to examine the effects of race-specific socioeconomic and labor market hardship (e.g., the concentration of households in poverty and joblessness within race) because these may lead to economic threat becoming linked to that group (e.g., African Americans). However, few studies have examined the effects of labor market and race-specific socioeconomic contextual variables (for an exception, see Western 2006). Much of the existing research in this vein has examined the effects of overall poverty rates (e.g., Yates and Fording 2005; Percival 2010; Heimer et al. 2012), overall economic inequality (e.g., Bridges, Crutchfield and

Simpson 1987) and racial economic inequality (e.g., Bridges and Crutchfield 1988; Yates 1997; Yates and Fording 2005). To date, no study has examined the effects of race-disaggregated poverty on imprisonment rates.[38] It is unknown whether the predicted positive association between race-specific economic disadvantage and imprisonment will differ across race.

Further, restricted availability of blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers may provide a labor market context that is associated with concentrated disadvantage for African Americans (e.g., Wilson 1978, 2009). To date, no study has examined the effects of the availability of local blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers on imprisonment.

Finally, Western (2006: 75) argues that disparity in prison admission rates by skill and within race increased faster than and are greater than the Black-White prison admission rate ratio. However, Western's (2006) analysis is at the state-level and does not disaggregate rates of prison admission by race. It is unknown whether this is associated with race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas and if these effects differ across race.

With regard to the *racialized economic threat hypothesis*, this project asks the following questions: First, is race-specific concentrated disadvantage (e.g., for African Americans and Whites) associated with prison admission rates? In other words, is concentrated disadvantage <u>within</u> local African American populations and co-occurring

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[38] Western (2006, Chapter 3) examines the effects of race-specific disadvantage on overall prison admission rates across U.S. states. Western (2006: 70) finds no significant association between unemployment rates for African American men and imprisonment rates. However, the effects of race-specific labor market and socioeconomic conditions on race-disaggregated prison admission rates at the local level are unknown.

patterns of social disorder (e.g., breakdown of informal, labor market and family informal social controls) associated with the subsequent use of (formal) criminal justice system control? Second, are restricted blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated with the breakdown of (informal) labor market social control and subsequent (formal) criminal justice system control? Finally, given Wilson's (1978) seminal work, are restricted blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers associated with disproportionate risk of prison admission African Americans compared to Whites?

This project predicts that concentrated socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage within the local African American population will be positively associated with prison admission rates for African Americans. Specifically, concentrated disadvantage among African Americans will not be significantly associated with prison admission rates for Whites.

- **Hypothesis 1**: The presence of impoverished African Americans will be positively associated with African American and not significantly associated with White prison admission rates.

Following the *racial threat hypothesis*, this project predicts that White disadvantage will be inversely associated with prison admission rates for African Americans, as threatening stereotypes are less often attached to White poverty.

- **Hypothesis 2:** The presence of impoverished Whites will be negatively associated with African American and not significantly associated with White prison admission rates.

Similarly, given Western's (2006: 75) argument that disparity in prison admission rates by skill and within race is greater than the disparity Black-White prison admission rates, this project asks the following questions: Is <u>within-race</u> percent of workers without college education associated with prison admission rates? Specifically, are overall concentrations of unskilled workers in the labor market and concentrations of unskilled workers <u>within</u> race (i.e., higher concentrations of unskilled workers <u>within</u> the local African American population) associated with prison admission rates? Do the effects of overall and race-specific unequal skill variables fully explain prison admission rates by race (i.e., when examining race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas) and do the effects of these variables differ across race?

- **<u>Hypothesis 3</u>**: The percent of workers without college education among African Americans will be positively associated with prison admission rates for both African Americans and Whites. This effect will be greater for African Americans.

Finally, following the historical analysis of Wilson (1978, 2009), which argues that deindustrialization contributed to concentrated disadvantage within African American communities (such that economic threat may become linked to this group), this project predicts that the availability of blue collar jobs for unskilled workers will be <u>inversely</u> associated with both African American and White prison admission rates. Further, the effects of *racialized economic threat* may be especially pronounced for African Americans, given historical disadvantages that result in educational inequalities between Whites and African Americans.

- **<u>Hypothesis 4</u>:** Restricted blue collar employment opportunities for unskilled workers will be positively associated with prison admission rates, as the loss of positions in this sector is linked to the growth of an economic "underclass" (and/or increased labor market competition among unskilled workers along racial lines) in need of social control. This effect will be greater for African Americans.

Variables

Dependent Variables

Outcome variables for this analysis are race-disaggregated, logged prison admission rates (African American and White). These rates are aggregated within local areas (PUMAs) and adjusted for local area race-specific adult population size. Please refer to Figure 3-1 for a complete list of data sources. Please refer to Tables 3-3, 5-1 and 5-2 for detailed variable definitions, descriptive statistics and correlations.

Independent Variables

Given Wilson's (1978) historical analysis, it is difficult to empirically separate the effects of racial and economic threat, as historical developments leading to concentrated disadvantage within African American communities may contribute to economic threat becoming tied to this group. Thus, to capture racial threat that may be tied African Americans, this analysis includes measures of race-specific socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage. These indicators include: percentages of African American households receiving public assistance; percentages of White households with income at or below the poverty line; percentage of African American men who are idle (following

Wilson's (1978, 2009) discussion of jobless poverty in African American communities, adult, able-bodied, non-student adults who are not working or are not in the labor force) and the percentage of Whites who are unemployed, following earlier work in the *economic threat* tradition (e.g., Spitzer 1975; Jankovic 1977; Wallace 1980; Adamson 1984).

In sum, this project argues that considerations of race-specific labor market and economic indicators may be a more fruitful avenue for research than what is provided in analyses of the absolute size of minority groups, as the perceived "threat" may be linked with patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage <u>within</u> these groups. However, prior research in criminology indicates that macro-level indicators of disadvantage are often concentrated within local areas and may be highly collinear (e.g., Land, McCall and Cohen1990). For this reason, this analysis includes a single standard principal component of indicators of disadvantage, which includes the concentration <u>within-race</u> socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage.

Images of Black poverty are often those of licentious "welfare queens" and idle Black males (e.g., Wilson 2009; Wacquant 2010). Although the percentage of households receiving public assistance is highly correlated with the percent of these households at or below the poverty level (which is used in the measure of White disadvantage, discussed below), this analysis elects to examine welfare, specifically, due to the underlying political discourse that is often associated with impoverished African American households. Thus, I extract a single standard principal component of African American disadvantage. This variable includes the percentage of African American households

receiving public assistance and the percentage of "idle" African American males. Factor loadings are .70 for each variable included.

Discussions of White idleness and White "welfare queens" are uncommon in the empirical literature. Instead, this project elects to use more traditional measures of to capture economic hardship among the White population. Thus, I extract a single standard principal component of White disadvantage that includes the percentage of White households at or below the poverty threshold and the percentage of Whites who are unemployed.[39] Factor loadings are .70 for each variable included.

Western (2006) finds that prison admission rates increased disproportionately for unskilled workers. For these reasons, I include a measure of the concentration of unskilled labor within local labor markets, measured as the percentage of the local adult (age 18-64) labor force that is unskilled, of the total local adult non-institutionalized labor force. Additionally, Western (2006) finds that within-race skill differences in prison admission rates are greater than the disparity in Black-White prison admission rates. Thus, I include a measure of the percent of workers without college education among African Americans, measured as the percentage of adult African Americans who are unskilled, of the total local adult African American population.

Similarly, given Wilson's (1978) historical analysis, restricted blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers may provide a labor market context associated with concentrated disadvantage for African Americans (*racialized economic threat*). For example, this may occur when these jobs are few and when the labor market has a high concentration of unskilled workers; thus, further linking African Americans with

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[39] Patterns of significance are unchanged in sensitivity analyses using factor variables comprised of identical (but race-specific) variables.

economic threat. Following this logic, I include the percentage of unskilled workers

employed in blue collar industries. As discussed in Chapter 3, I create this measure by

aggregating IPUMs micro-data to create local rates of employment in manufacturing,

construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries. This particular group

of industries is selected because, historically, positions in this sector often provide

relatively high paying employment opportunities for workers without college educations.

<div align="center">Control Variables</div>

Although this project argues that race-specific socioeconomic indicators are a

more fruitful avenue for research than analyses of minority group population size, I

control for the percentage of the local population that is African American and

percentage that is Latino.[40] I include a population control (in millions) for local areas

(PUMAs). Arguably, imprisonment rates are influenced by state-level factors. For

example, it could be the case that local prison admission rates are primarily driven by

state correctional policies; thus, states that imprison proportionally more of their citizens

would be expected to also have higher local prison admission rates. Given this, I include

a control for state imprisonment rates.

Because crime should be associated with imprisonment and I am interested in

examining social processes beyond that of local crime rates, I control for crimes known

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[40] However, as noted in Chapter 2, some empirical research linking minority group presence and
imprisonment suggests that this relationship is not linear (e.g., Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and
West 2001; Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2005; Keen and Jacobs 2009). Some argue that minority groups gain
political power after reaching a population threshold (e.g., Jackson and Carroll 1981), and there is some
evidence that smaller changes in minority group population size more strongly affect imprisonment rates in
states and counties with smaller minority group populations (e.g., Jackson and Carroll 1981; Bridges and
Crutchfield 1988; Yates 1997; Jacobs, Carmichael and Kent 2005; Liska 1992; Keen and Jacobs 2009).
Yet, recent research finds no evidence of a negative and curvilinear association between minority group
population and imprisonment rates (e.g., Heimer et al. 2012).

to local police. I use 2-year average rates of county-level serious felonies known to police for all UCR Part I Index offenses within local areas (PUMAs). This project is not about crime, of course, but rather about imprisonment, as this is a major source of state control (i.e., in keeping with the view that the state uses criminal punishment to solve problems of social order).

Statistical Analysis

Because it is likely that there is an association between the error terms in models predicting African American and White prison admission rates, I utilize seemingly unrelated regression to fit both models simultaneously. As I have a large sample of local areas and two time points, I estimate my seemingly unrelated regression model using first differenced variables.[41] This longitudinal analysis is advantageous, in that it allows for the control of other important, but unmeasured, time-invariant characteristics of local areas that may be associated with prison admission rates. After differencing and deleting missing cases, 345 observations remain (N=345). Each model is weighted by the respective racial group population size.[42] This is important in the current analysis. For example, this accounts for the possibility that areas with small African American populations may have undue influence on the results due to greater fluctuations in the respective prison admission rates.

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[41] That is, the observation at time 2 minus the observation at time 1.

[42] Seemingly unrelated regression models in Stata do not allow for different weights across equations. To weight each model differently requires that all variables are adjusted accordingly. Specifically, I multiply differenced variables by the square root of the respective group population in each equation. I also add an intercept variable that is equal to the square root of the respective group population and suppress the constant term (i.e., the 'nocons' option in Stata).

I conduct a thorough analysis of residuals, and find no evidence of violations of constant-variance and normality assumptions.[43] Additionally, I compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess potential multicollinearity for each model and found that no VIF exceeds 5, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in these models (e.g., Menard 1995). Further, I plot the dependent variable, along with the predicted values of X, as well as the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval for predicting X by decade, grouped by local area (PUMA). The models show no obvious lack of fit to the data. Confidence intervals are notably narrower for larger areas and wider for smaller areas due to more variability in the outcomes of smaller areas. In addition, I compute Cook's D statistics to examine the effects of influential cases on the models. I identify fifteen influential cases in the African American model and fourteen influential cases in the White model ($Di > 4/n$ or $Di > .012$). The patterns of significance in my estimates do not change for upon the deletion of these cases.[44] Please refer to Appendix A for visual representations of model diagnostic plots.

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[43] I plotted predicted values ($\hat{Y}$) and covariate values against residuals in a series of plots and found no evidence of heteroscedasticity.

[44] Influential cases included the following local areas: **Black Model**: Atlanta, GA, Sioux City, IA, Central (collection of counties near Humbolt county/ non-MSA) IA, Des Moines, IA, Waterloo/ Cedar Falls, IA, Huntington/ Ashland, KY, Rochester, MN, Duluth, MN, Springfield, MO, Asheville, NC, Greensboro/Highpoint, NC, Central (collection of counties near Mullan, NE/ non-MSA) NE, Syracuse, NY, Clark (collection of counties/ non-MSA), WI, and Braxton (collection of counties/ non-MSA), WV. **White Model**: Fayetteville, AR, Atlanta, GA, DC/Arlington/Alexandria, MD, Butler (collection of counties/ non-MSA), MO, Greensboro/Highpoint, NC, Durham/Raleigh, NC, Fayetteville, NC, Jacksonville, NC, Hickory NC, Winston/Salem, NC, Bronx, NY, Memphis, TN, McAllen/Eidenbury, TX, and Vilas (collection of counties/ non-MSA), WI. The concentration of influential cases in North Carolina may be due to anomalous reporting of prison admission rates to NCRP. However, excluding North Carolina from this analysis does not change the patterns of significance in estimates.

<u>Results</u>

Of the control variables included in this model, the largest effect is for state imprisonment, which is significantly and positively associated with local prison admission rates. This suggests that local prison admission rates are affected by state-level correctional contexts. Local population is not significantly associated with prison admission rates for either group after accounting for other covariates. Local crime known to police is a not significant predictor of prison admission rates for African Americans but is significantly and negatively associated with White rates. This may reflect trends in crime rates, which dropped during this time period as prison admission rates increased. I do not find significant effects for percentage of the local population that is African American after accounting for other factors, including socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage factor variables. Interestingly, I find that the percentage of the local population that is Latino is inversely associated with prison admission rates for African Americans and fails to reach statistical significance when predicting White prison admission rates. The implications of this finding will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. For ease of interpretation of the remaining models, findings of the most substantively important effect sizes (as additive incremental increase) and their 95% confidence intervals are discussed. Please refer to Tables 5-2, 5-3 and Figure 5-5.

Consistent with hypotheses derived from the *racialized economic threat* perspective, concentrated socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage among African Americans is positively associated with prison admission rates for this group. Specifically, a one-unit increase in concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage within the local African American population is associated with a significant 18.2% (95% CI: 4.8%

– 33.4%; p-value<.007) increase in Black prison admission rates, holding all else constant. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. A Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across equations reveals that the effect of concentrated disadvantage among African Americans is statistically different across models. This suggests that the effect of concentrated African American disadvantage on prison admission rates is significantly greater for African Americans. Thus, it appears that the economic situations of African Americans are, indeed, associated with increased criminal punishment.

Also consistent with the predictions of the *racialized economic threat* perspective, concentrated socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage among White Americans is inversely associated with prison admission rates for African Americans. Specifically, a one-unit increase in concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage within the local White population is associated with a significant13.7% (95% CI: -23.2% – -3.0%; p-value<.014) decrease in African American prison admission rates, and holding all else constant. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. A Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across equations reveals that this effect is statistically different across models. This suggests that the inverse association for White disadvantage may be greater for African Americans. Thus, it appears that White poverty is less "threatening" and does not produce the same punitive response from the criminal justice system.

Consistent with Western's (2006) findings, concentrated educational disadvantage among African Americans is positively associated with prison admission rates for both African Americans and Whites. Specifically, a five percentage point increase in African

Americans who are unskilled in the local population is associated with a significant

14.9% (95% CI: 5.1% − 25.5%; p-value<.002) and a 2.8% (95% CI: 0.1% − 5.8%; p-

value<.050) <u>increase</u> in African American and White prison admission rates,

respectively, holding all else constant. A Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across

equations reveals that the effects of concentrated educational disadvantage among

African Americans is statistically different across models, suggesting that the effects of

this positive association may be greater for African Americans. Thus, it appears that the

concentration of unskilled workers within a particular racial group may lead to more

punitive criminal justice system outcomes, especially for African Americans.

Also consistent with Western's (2006) findings, the concentration of unskilled

workers within local labor markets is positively associated with <u>both</u> African American

and White prison admission rates. Specifically, a five percentage point increase in the

local concentration of unskilled workers is associated with a significant 28% (95% CI:

9.6% − 49.5%; p-value<.002) and a 19.6% (95% CI: 4.1% − 37.4%; p-value<.012)

increase in African American and White prison admission rates, respectively, holding all

else constant. A Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across equations fails to reach

significance, suggesting that the effect of this covariate is not statistically different

between groups. Thus, it appears that the overall skill composition of the local labor

market (i.e., higher concentration of unskilled workers) is associated with higher prison

admission rates for <u>both</u> African Americans and Whites.

Finally, the concentration of unskilled workers in blue collar industries is

<u>inversely</u> associated with African American prison admission rates and marginally so for

Whites. Specifically, a 5 percentage point increase in unskilled blue collar employment is

associated with a significant 16.8% (95% CI: 30.8% − 0.1%; p-value<.050) <u>decrease</u> in African American prison admission rates in the corresponding geographical area, and holding all else constant. This suggests that there are, indeed, connections between deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates by race across local areas. Interestingly, a Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across equations fails to reach significance, suggesting that the effect of this covariate is not statistically different between groups. This is inconsistent with hypotheses derived from the *racialized economic threat* perspective, which predict that this effect is greater for African Americans, given patterns of historical discrimination contributing to racial educational inequalities between African Americans and Whites in the U.S.

<u>Discussion</u>

In sum, this chapter examines the effects of concentrated disadvantage and labor market contextual factors on race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas. To date, no analysis has examined the associations between race-specific socioeconomic disadvantage and the percent of workers without college education, unskilled blue collar employment and race-disaggregated prison admission rates at the local level. The findings presented here have important implications for theory and research on imprisonment in the United States.

My *racialized economic threat* hypothesis receives strong support. Concentrated disadvantage among local African American populations is significantly and positively associated with and effects are significantly greater for African American prison admission rates. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. It appears that Whites are relatively more insulated from the punitive responses associated with large

and/or increasing poor African American populations when compared to their Black counterparts.

Similarly, concentrated socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage among White Americans is significantly and <u>inversely</u> associated with prison admission rates for African Americans. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. This is consistent with the *racialized economic threat* perspective, which argues that economic "threat" has become linked to impoverished African Americans and threatening stereotypes are less often attached to White poverty. Put simply, African American poverty appears to be considered threatening, while White poverty is not.[45]

The concentration of unskilled workers within local labor markets is significantly and positively associated with <u>both</u> African American and White prison admission rates. This is consistent with Western's (2006) study, which found that risk of imprisonment is greater for unskilled workers compared to their college-educated counterparts. Thus, higher concentrations of unskilled workers appear to be associated with higher prison admission rates.

Also consistent with Western's (2006) results, concentrated educational disadvantage among African Americans is significantly and positively associated with prison admission rates for <u>both</u> African Americans and Whites. This suggests that the presence of unskilled African Americans may be associated with the increased use of

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[45] Additionally, growth in the concentration of disadvantage among Whites may reduce the connection between economic threat and race for African Americans, as the "face" of poverty becomes includes a greater diversity of racial backgrounds. Another explanation (albeit post-hoc) may be that as White poverty increases, local areas have fewer resources for criminal justice prosecution and incarceration.

criminal punishment for <u>both</u> groups. This is particularly striking, given that I find this effect <u>net</u> of controlling for serious felonies known to police.

Interestingly, the effects of concentrated educational disadvantage among African Americans are significantly greater for African American prison admission rates. This is not surprising, given the historical disadvantages faced by many African Americans, and the tendency for such disadvantages to be reflected in contemporary outcomes (e.g., concentrated disadvantage and social disorder, as described by Wilson 1978, 2009). These findings are also consistent with Western's (2006: 74) recent work, which finds that unskilled African Americans are much more likely to be admitted to prison compared to their white counterparts.

Consistent with hypotheses derived from the *racialized economic threat* perspective, the concentration of unskilled workers in blue collar industries is significantly and <u>negatively</u> associated with prison admission rates for African Americans and marginally so for Whites. This provides partial support for the final hypothesis derived from Wilson's (1978) historical analysis, which argues that restricted blue collar opportunities are associated with increased criminal justice control of African Americans. Employment in this sector does appear to be significantly and negatively associated with African American prison admission rates, however, a Wald test reveals that this effect is not statistically different across race. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that this effect should be greater for African Americans.

In addition, these results also provide partial support for Western's (2006) assertion that disparity in men's prison admission rates are greater across skill than across race and suggests that there are, indeed, connections between the percent of workers

without college education, deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates by race across local areas. However, I do not find support for Western's assertion that skill differences explain disproportionate risk of incarceration across race. Other factors (e.g., race-specific socioeconomic disadvantage and blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers) are significant predictors of prison admission rates by race, net of the percent of workers without college education within race.[46]

In contrast to some earlier findings discussed earlier in this chapter, I do not find significant effects for percentage of the local population that is African American after accounting for other factors, including race-specific concentrated disadvantage factor variables. Thus, race-specific concentrated disadvantage may be a more fruitful avenue for research than analyses of the absolute size of minority groups. This suggests that the perceived "threat" tied to African Americans may be linked with patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage within these groups.

Interestingly, I find that the percent of the local population that is Latino is significantly and inversely associated with prison admission rates for African Americans and fails to reach statistical significance when predicting White prison admission rates. I did not predict this association a priori, but this result is consistent with the *racialized economic threat hypothesis* and recent work by Heimer and her colleagues (2012). These scholars argue that the increasing presence of Latinos may represent another source of "threat" from an economically marginalized group and may reduce punitive outcomes for

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[46] I use sensitivity analyses to examine the unequal skill hypothesis in detail. I first examine the effects of overall and race-specific skill variables, net of controls and without other causal variables. I then examine the effects of other causal variables, net of controls and without overall and race-specific skill variables. Patterns of significance in estimates do not change in either model.

African Americans. Further, large and/or growing local populations of Latinos may also result in increased prison admission rates for this group (Heimer et al. 2012). However, it is not possible to examine prison admission rates for Latinos at this time due to data limitations in National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data.[47] I discuss the implications of this limitation of the current project and discuss avenues for future research in Chapter 6.

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[47] Please refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

**Figure 5-1: Average Local Prison Admission Rates by Race
(per 100, 000) (N=345)**

Figure 5-2: Average Local Rate Ratio of Black-to-White Prison Admission Rates (N=345)

Figure 5-3: Percentage Change in Black-to-White Prison Admission Rate Ratio, 2000 – 1990

25.7% - 366%
13.1% - 25.6%
7.1% - 13%
4.7% - 7%
0.03% - 4.6%
<0.03%
No data

Note: Figure 5-3 depicts local variation in percentage change in Black-White rate ratios of prison admission rates across local areas from 1990 to 2000. Darker colors indicate greater increases in the rate ratio of Black-to-White prison admission rates during that time period. Black areas are those that did not report to National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data collections in both years.

Table 5-1: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (Study 2) (N=345)

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Variance	Min	Max
Local Black Prison Admission Rate	0.074	0.012	0.768	0.591	0.000	20.249
Local White Prison Admission Rate	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.024
Local Population (millions)	0.494	0.233	0.699	0.488	0.100	5.828
Percent State Imprisonment	0.474	0.470	0.188	0.035	0.099	1.051
Local Crimes known to Police	0.005	0.000	0.084	0.007	0.000	1.931
Local Percent Black	10.600	5.708	12.449	154.984	0.019	81.762
Local Percent Latino	7.459	2.544	12.465	155.388	0.060	88.063
Local African American SES Disadvantage	0.000	-0.065	1.005	1.010	-4.553	4.834
Local White SES Disadvantage	0.000	-0.093	1.222	1.494	-2.565	6.374
Local Percent Unskilled African Americans	65.807	68.330	11.451	131.135	0.000	100.000
Local Percent Unskilled Workers	64.157	65.965	9.002	81.042	17.157	78.608
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment	22.766	22.129	8.413	70.777	3.812	57.011

Table 5-2: Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Study 2) (N=345)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Local African American Prison Admission Rate	1.000											
Local White Prison Admission Rate	0.493	1.000										
Local Population (millions)	0.056	0.110	1.000									
Percent State Imprisonment	0.133	0.369	0.132	1.000								
Local Crimes known to Police	0.023	0.012	0.180	0.045	1.000							
Local Percent Black	-0.059	0.062	0.128	0.311	0.270	1.000						
Local Percent Latino	0.006	0.273	0.220	0.283	0.201	-0.093	1.000					
Local African American SES Disadvantage	-0.121	-0.030	-0.054	0.185	-0.097	-0.177	0.029	1.000				
Local White SES Disadvantage	-0.289	0.103	-0.145	-0.133	0.012	-0.086	-0.028	0.050	1.000			
Local Percent Unskilled African Americans	0.026	0.155	0.075	0.159	0.066	0.254	0.029	-0.017	0.052	1.000		
Local Percent Unskilled Workers	-0.129	0.171	-0.108	-0.070	-0.060	-0.125	-0.056	0.060	0.497	0.371	1.000	
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment	-0.073	0.025	-0.172	-0.196	-0.264	-0.508	-0.191	0.134	0.452	0.109	0.706	1.000

Table 5-3: Effect Sizes for Significant Covariates: Percentage Change in Black and White Prison Admission Rates, 2000 - 1990

Effect	Increase in Covariate	Estimated Percent Change	95% Confidence Interval		p value	Wald Test Difference
			Lower	Upper		
Black SES/ Labor Market Disadvantage [1]	1 unit increase					
		18.2%	4.8%	33.4%	0.007	**
Black		4.4%	-2.1%	11.4%	0.192	
White						
White SES/ Labor Market Disadvantage [2]	1 unit increase					
		-13.7%	-23.2%	-3.0%	0.014	**
Black		-0.1%	-12.5%	14.3%	0.998	
White						
Percent of Blacks who are Unskilled	5 percentage point increase					
		14.9%	5.1%	25.5%	0.002	**
Black		**2.8%**	0.1%	5.8%	0.050	
White						
Percent Unskilled Workers	5 percentage point increase					
		28.0%	9.6%	49.5%	0.002	
Black		**19.6%**	4.1%	37.4%	0.012	
White						
Percent Unskilled Workers in Blue Collar Industries [3]	5 percentage point increase					
		-16.8%	-30.8%	-0.1%	0.050	
Black		-11.7%	-23.1%	13.3%	0.076	
White						

Note: N=345.

[1] Factor variable of the percent of Blacks who are jobless and percent of Black households receiving public assistance.

[2] Factor variable of the percent of Whites who are unemployed and percent of White households in poverty.

[3] Percent of unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, fishing and forestry industries, per 1,000 of the local population.

Table 5-4: Parameter Estimates for all Covariates from Seemingly Unrelated (First Difference) Regression of Black and White Prison Admission Rates, 2000 – 1990

Covariate	Black	White	Wald Test of Difference
Local Population (millions)	-.080	-.181	
	(.137)	(.133)	
Percent State Imprisonment (logged)	.741***	.694***	
	(.117)	(.113)	
Local Crimes known to Police (logged)[1]	-.060	-.091*	
	(.039)	(.041)	
Local Percent Black	-.016+	.002	
	(.009)	(.016)	
Local Percent Latino	-.023*	.006	**
	(.011)	(.011)	
Local Black SES Disadvantage[2]	.168**	.043	**
	(.062)	(.033)	
Local White SES Disadvantage[3]	-.147*	-.001	**
	(.060)	(.069)	
Local Percent Unskilled Blacks [4]	.028**	.006*	**
	(.009)	(.003)	
Local Percent Unskilled Workers [5]	.049**	.036*	
	(.016)	(.014)	
Local Percent Unskilled Blue Collar Employment [6]	-.037*	-.025+	
	(.019)	(.014)	
Intercept	-.274**	-.065	
	(.096)	(.090)	

Note: N=345. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

[1] Part 1 Index Offenses

[2] Factor variable of the percent of Blacks who are jobless and percent of Black households receiving public assistance.

[3] Factor variable of the percent of Whites who are jobless and percent of White households in poverty.
[4] Of local Black population.

[5] Of local civilian labor force.

Figure 5-4: Percentage Change in Local Prison Admission Rates (2000 - 1990) for Whites and African Americans (N=345)

Note: Figure 5-4 depicts effect sizes for significant covariates predicting percentage change in Black and White prison admission rates from 1990 to 2000. '**' denotes that a Wald test of equivalence in coefficients across equations is statistically significant (p<.01).

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

Introduction

The past three decades have seen major shifts in labor markets and imprisonment

rates increased in the United States, even during a period of declining crime rates (e.g.,

Western 2006). Further, scholars argue that beginning in the 1970s, policies targeting the

poor population (including criminal justice policies) have taken a more punitive turn.

Specifically, rising imprisonment rates co-occurred with the resurgence of Republican

Party popularity (e.g., Beckett 1997; Garland 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Beckett

and Sasson 2004).

Much of the empirical work examining associations between labor markets and

imprisonment focuses on unemployment rates (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Inverarity

and McCarthy 1988; Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Colvin 1990; Chiricos and Delone

1992; Hochstetler and Shover 1997; Greenberg and West 2001; Smith 2004; Stucky,

Heimer and Lang 2005). Given the diversity of outcomes for unskilled workers in the

post-industrial labor market (e.g., Michalowski and Carlson 1999; Di Giorgi 2006), this

project argues that indicators of labor market polarization, such as the percent of workers

without college education among men and restricted blue collar employment

opportunities, are better measures of labor market and economic hardship than

unemployment rates. Research has not examined whether these may better capture the

marginalized populations that are disproportionately subject to control through the

criminal justice system. Similarly, no research has investigated the effects of restricted

blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers in combination with partisan

political movements that redefined and fundamentally shifted policies targeting the populations most likely to face economic hardships.

In addition, much of the existing research in this vein has been at the national (e.g., Greenberg 1977; Laffargue and Godefroy 1989; Sabol 1989; Lessan 1991; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Michalowski and Carlson 1999) and state levels (e.g., Myers and Sabol 1987; Inverarity and McCarthy 1988; Michalowski and Pearson 1990; Greenberg and West 2001; Smith 2004; Stucky et al. 2005; Western 2006), and results are inconsistent. As discussed in Chapter 4, the U.S. is a very large and decentralized nation, and labor market conditions and prison admission rates vary considerably across smaller units of analysis. Past research has largely ignored this variation. It is possible that at least some of the inconsistencies in earlier studies may be due to important variation that is missed at higher units of aggregation. To address these limitations, this project examines the effects of more nuanced labor market and political partisanship contextual variables on prison admission rates at the local level.

In addition, understanding the association between labor market conditions and imprisonment may be especially important for the criminal justice experiences of historically disadvantaged minority groups. As discussed in earlier chapters, African Americans are much more likely to be incarcerated than Whites (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western 2006). Specifically, scholars note that by the year 2001, African Americans were at least five times more likely to be incarcerated than Whites at the national level (e.g., Bonczar 2003; Mauer 2006; Western 2006; Uggen and Manza 2006).

Yet, much of the existing research in this vein has, to date, focused on the effects of minority group population size on imprisonment rates (e.g., Meyers 1990; Arvanites

1993; Taggart and Winn 1991; Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson 1987; Arvanites and Asher 1998; Jacobs and Helms 1999; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Yates and Fording 2005; Western 2006; Keen and Jacobs 2009). However, the social control perspective adopted here argues that, in addition to minority group size, other race-specific economic and labor market indicators (e.g., race-specific idleness, concentrated disadvantage and the percent of workers without college education may be associated with prison admission rates. Given historical racial inequalities and the pronounced negative effects of labor market declines on unskilled racial minorities (e.g., Wilson 1987, 2009; Tigges and Tootle 1993; Huffman and Cohen 2004; Dickerson 2007), this project argues that the association between race and criminal punishment may occur because of the link between economic threat and fear of African American crime (i.e., *racialized economic threat*).

Further, no study examines these explanations for imprisonment by race (i.e., beyond minority group population size, such as *racialized economic threat*) using race-disaggregated multivariate analyses. As Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) and Heimer and her colleagues (2012) argue, analyses of race-disaggregated rates are important, as examining overall rates cannot capture whether the effects of covariates apply to both groups. In addition, few studies of imprisonment by race utilize counties and local areas as units of analysis (for exceptions, see Bridges et al. 1987 and Percival 2010). As discussed in Chapter 5, minority group populations and racial imprisonment disparity vary across smaller geographical areas. Thus, it is important to examine these associations at the local level, as higher units of aggregation may mask important variation. To address these limitations, this project examines the effects of race-specific

socioeconomic and labor market contextual variables on race-disaggregated prison admission rates across local areas.

As discussed in Chapter 3, there is no one dataset that includes all of the information needed to assess the research questions of this project. Thus, this project creates a unique dataset to evaluate the effects of local economic and labor market conditions on prison admission rates. Specifically, this project combines data from two primary sources: the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) (1989 and 1999), and Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) data (1990 and 2000), along with general election data from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (1995), Federal Elections Project (Lublin and Voss 2001), as well as crime and criminal justice system characteristics (1990 and 2000).

This chapter is organized as follows. This chapter first discusses the major empirical findings reported in Chapters 4 and 5 with regard to their respective theoretical implications. Second, this chapter discusses limitations of this project and directions for future research. Third, significance of these findings is discussed in connection to other literature, and the broader effects of mass incarceration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings of this project for social policy.

<u>Summary of Background, Research Questions, Results and</u>

<u>Theoretical Implications</u>

The Local Labor Market and Political Context of Prison

Admission Rates

The empirical findings of Chapter 4 suggest that the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted unskilled blue collar employment are

positively associated with prison admission rates within the corresponding local areas. These findings are consistent with Western's (2006) findings that disparity in men's prison admission rates is greatest across skill. This suggests that there are, indeed, connections between the percent of workers without college education among men, deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates across local areas.

Interestingly, the local percent unemployment fails to reach significance after accounting for my independent variables and other characteristics of states and local areas. This finding is consistent with theoretical arguments of Di Giorgi (2006), Michaolowski and Carlson (1999) and others who argue that unemployment may not completely capture the labor market experiences of the post-industrial working class. In sum, the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that other characteristics of local workers and indicators of local labor market opportunities (e.g., the percent of workers without college education among men and restricted blue collar job opportunities for unskilled workers) are better predictors of the punitive response of the criminal justice system than unemployment rates. Finally, results from Chapter 4 further suggest that there is a positive association between the proportion of the local area voting Republican and prison admission rates in the corresponding areas, and that local partisanship is an important consideration in examining the effects of the political context of prison admission rates.

Local Labor Market Opportunities, Concentrated

Disadvantage, and Prison Admission Rates by Race

Chapter 5 demonstrates that it is important to examine the effects of race-specific socioeconomic and labor market hardship (e.g., the concentration of households in poverty and joblessness within race). Arguably, the concentration of poverty and idle workers within a particular racial or ethnic group (e.g., African Americans) may lead to economic threat becoming linked to that group. Consistent with the predictions of this theoretical perspective, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that concentrated disadvantage among local African American populations is significantly and positively associated with African American prison admission rates and the effects of this variable are significantly greater for African Americans. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. This is consistent with the recent findings of Heimer and her colleagues (2012). It appears that Whites are relatively more insulated from the punitive responses associated with large and/or increasing poor African American populations when compared to their Black counterparts.

Similarly, concentrated socioeconomic and labor market disadvantage among White Americans is significantly and negatively associated with prison admission rates for African Americans. Interestingly, I do not find a similar effect for Whites. This is consistent with the predictions of the *racialized economic threat* perspective, which argues that economic "threat" has become linked to impoverished African Americans and threatening stereotypes are less often attached to White poverty. Put simply, African American poverty appears to be considered threatening while White poverty is not.

Additionally, growth in the concentration of disadvantage among Whites may reduce the connection between economic threat and race for African Americans.

The effects of concentrated educational disadvantage among African Americans are significantly greater for African American prison admission rates. This is not surprising, given the historical disadvantages faced by many African Americans, and the tendency for such disadvantages to be reflected in contemporary outcomes (e.g., concentrated disadvantage and social disorder, as described by Wilson 1978, 2009). In addition, concentrated educational disadvantage among African Americans is significantly and positively associated with prison admission rates for both African Americans and Whites. These findings are also consistent with Western's (2006: 74) recent work, which finds that unskilled African Americans are much more likely to be admitted to prison compared to their white counterparts. This suggests that the presence of unskilled African Americans may be associated with the increased use of criminal punishment for both groups. This is particularly striking, given that I find this effect net of controlling for rates of serious felonies known to the police.

Further, Western's (2006: 75) bivariate analysis reveals that disparities in prison admission rates by skill and within race are greater than the Black-White disparity in prison admission rates. Consistent with this work, these results suggest that the overall concentration of unskilled workers within local labor markets is positively associated with African American and White prison admission rates. This suggests that educational inequalities are, indeed, associated with increases in prison admission rates. However, race-specific socioeconomic disadvantage and blue collar labor market opportunities for unskilled workers are also significant predictors of prison admission rates by race. Thus,

educational inequalities within race do not completely explain patterns in race-disaggregated prison admission rates.

Finally, consistent with the predictions of the *racialized economic threat* perspective, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that the restricted availability of blue collar opportunities for unskilled workers may provide a labor market context that is associated with concentrated disadvantage for African Americans (e.g., Wilson 1978, 2009). Specifically, the concentration of unskilled workers in blue collar industries is significantly and <u>negatively</u> associated with African American prison admission rates and marginally so for Whites. This finding provides partial support for hypotheses derived from Wilson's (1978) argument that restricted blue collar opportunities for unskilled are associated with higher rates or prison admission for African Americans. Employment in this sector does appear to be significantly and negatively associated with African American prison admission rates, however, a Wald test reveals that this effect is not statistically different across race. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that this effect should be greater for African Americans.

Inconsistent with the predictions of the *racial threat* perspective, the results of this project suggest that the percent of the local population that is Latino is not a significant predictor of overall rates of prison admission after accounting for other characteristics of state and local areas (Chapter 4). However, I find that the percent of the local population that is Latino is significantly and inversely associated with prison admission rates for African Americans and fails to reach statistical significance when predicting White prison admission rates (Chapter 5). I did not predict this association a priori, but this result is consistent with the racialized economic threat hypothesis and

recent work by Heimer and her colleagues (2012). These scholars argue that the increasing presence of Latinos may represent another source of "threat" from an economically marginalized group and may reduce punitive outcomes for African Americans.

In sum, the findings of Chapter 5 suggest that there are, indeed, connections between educational inequalities, deteriorating labor market conditions for unskilled workers and rising prison admission rates by race across local areas. I do not find significant effects for the percent of the local population that is African American after accounting for other factors, including race-specific socioeconomic disadvantage factor variables. Thus, indicators of concentrated disadvantage that are race-specific may be a more fruitful avenue for research than analyses of the absolute size of minority groups, as the perceived "threat" may be linked with patterns of labor market and socioeconomic disadvantage within these groups.

<div align="center">Limitations and Directions for Future Research</div>

The availability and accuracy of data sources presents limitations on the number of geographical areas represented in the current sample. First, a limitation of this project is that every state is represented in the current sample. Not all states contribute data to the Bureau of Justice Statistics collection of National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data. Specifically, a total of 34 states reported to NCRP in 1989 and 1999. Second, the representativeness of the sample is further limited by missing local crime data. Participation in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program is voluntary and not all law enforcement agencies in the U.S. contribute data on crimes within their jurisdiction to the UCR. Specifically, fifty-eight local areas (PUMAs) are excluded from

the analysis due to missing UCR data. Third, some additional local areas are excluded

from Study One due to missing local political partisanship data. Specifically, sixteen

local areas are not included in local political partisanship data. Thirteen of these cases are

missing in the year 1990 (ICPSR 1995), and three are missing in the year 2000 (Lublin

and Voss 2001). Three of the local areas missing political partisanship data are also

missing in UCR statistics.

Although not examined in this project, it should be noted that there is scholarly

disagreement about the fundamental causes of concentrated disadvantage within African

American communities. In contrast to Wilson (1978, 2009), Massey and Denton (1993)

argue that the effects of deindustrialization on African American communities would not

have been nearly so devastating if not for residential segregation.[48] The current project

does not examine this possibility, as the tract-level data needed to create indices of

residential segregation are not available in IPUMs micro-data. Yet, it is important to note

that, even ignoring residential segregation, unskilled blue collar employment has

important effects on prison admission rates. Future work examining segregation across

local areas, cities and/or MSAs is needed.

Additionally, this project does not examine the criminal justice control of other

racial and ethnic minority groups, such as Latinos. The present study does not examine

Latino prison admission rates due to data limitations of National Corrections Reporting

Program (NCRP) data. Specifically, due to variation across states in reporting inmate

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[48] Specifically, these scholars argue that residential segregation is associated with concentrated poverty and also contributes to a self-reinforcing cycle of decline and downward mobility. Furthermore, they argue that racial segregation enables all other forms of racial oppression (e.g., within the labor market, educational system and welfare bureaucracy), such that segregation "binds them [systems of oppression] together in a coherent and uniquely effective system of racial subordination" (1993: 8).

ethnicity, it not possible to consistently disaggregate persons of Latino background in NCRP over time.[49] Future research should examine Latino rates of prison when accurate data become available.

Ideally, it would be best to examine the imprisonment experiences of persons of Latino ethnicity vis-à-vis Whites and African Americans. There is some evidence that the size of the Latino population across U.S. states is associated with fear of crime (e.g., Rumbaut 2008; Wang 2012) and increases in public support for criminal punishment in areas where Whites are numerical minorities (e.g., Chiricos, McIntire and Gertz 2001). Indeed, Latinos are over-represented in the criminal justice system (e.g., Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Mauer and King 2007; Harris, Steffensmeir, Ullmer, and Painter-Davis 2009; Lopez and Livingston 2009). For example, research by The Sentencing Project suggests that Latinos are incarcerated at nearly double the rate of Whites (Mauer and King 2007).

Relatedly, future research examining labor markets and criminal justice outcomes should consider the effects of immigration on imprisonment, especially given trends in Latino immigration in recent decades (e.g., American Community Survey 2008; Massey and Capoferro 2009), as growing populations of immigrant groups may be perceived as a source of threat and/or competition. Interestingly, while Latinos are over-represented in the criminal justice system, many recent studies find no evidence that Latino immigration is positively associated with crime (e.g., Martinez and Lee 1998; Martinez, Nielsen, and Lee 2003; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez 2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010; Martinez and Stowell 2012), and some studies even

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[49] Please refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

find that the concentration of Latinos is <u>negatively</u> associated with homicide rates (e.g., Stowell, Martinez and Cancino 2012).

Further, while Latino immigrants account for roughly 50% of all U.S. immigrants since 1980, (U.S. Census 2000), many recent studies examining immigration (more generally) do not disaggregate immigrant groups (e.g., Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Reid, Weiss, Adelman and Jarrett 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell, Messner, , McGeever and Raffalovich, 2009). This may be especially important for Latinos, given the diversity of these groups.[50] Additionally, some research suggests that first generation immigrants are less likely to commit violent crime than subsequent generations (e.g., Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005). Thus, it is also important to examine the effects of first and subsequent generations of immigrants separately.

Future research examining labor markets and imprisonment experiences of unskilled workers should consider the effects of other labor market characteristics, such as unionization. Some scholars argue that unionization benefits all workers in the labor market, regardless of union membership. For example, Leicht (1989) argues that the presence of unions may contribute to nonunion employers raising wages to discourage union organization. Further, Western and Rosenfeld (2011: 514) argue that unions contribute to a "moral economy" that is associated with norms of "fair pay" and higher wages for all workers, even those who are not unionized. Indeed, these scholars find that union decline explains one fifth of the increase in overall wage inequality among men (e.g., Western and Rosenfeld 2011). However, Western and Rosenfeld (2011) examined the effects of union decline at the national level. As discussed previously, labor market

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[50] For example, the experiences of immigrants who are Mexican are arguably very different from those who are Puerto Rican, Cuban, etc…

conditions vary across smaller geographical units. Thus, future research examining the effects of unionization on criminal justice experiences should examine this association across counties or metropolitan areas (e.g., Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)).

In addition, some evidence suggests that labor market conditions for unskilled men worsened after the year 2000. The current project examines the time period 1990 – 2000. Specifically, recent empirical works suggest that labor market prospects for young, unskilled men, in particular, continued to deteriorate following the economic boom in 2000 and since then incurred severe job losses in the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 (e.g., Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, and Palma 2011; Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006; Mincy 2005; Sum, McLaughlin, and Palma 2009; Sum, Mangum, and Taggart 2002). Specifically, Sum and colleagues (2011) find that the recent Great Recession substantially reduced demand for labor in most of the occupations and industries in which unskilled males find employment.

The current analysis finds support for the idea that imprisonment increases as labor market conditions for unskilled workers deteriorated during the time period 1990 - 2000. Currently, NCRP data are only available 1983 – 2004. Future research should examine the associations between labor market conditions and imprisonment before, during and after the Great Recession. However, some recent evidence suggests that the positive association between deteriorating economic conditions and rates of prison admission may change as some states may respond to fiscal crises by reducing correctional expenditures and releasing prisoners (e.g., Barker 2011).

In addition, the labor market conditions examined in the current project are largely those that affect unskilled men (e.g., blue collar employment). However, additional research examining the labor market conditions affecting women is needed. Evidence suggests that both men's and women's imprisonment rates increased greatly since the 1970s, but women's rates appear to be increasing faster than men's (e.g., Beck and Harrison 2001; Heimer, Johnson, Lang, Rengifo and Stemen 2012). Some scholars argue that post-industrial labor market shifts are also associated with increased inequality within gender (e.g., McCall 2001). Further, social policies shifted during this time period, reflecting a new orientation toward poor populations (and poor women, in particular), as evidenced by the retrenchment of social welfare provisions and subsequent increases in formal social control, including imprisonment (e.g., Garland 1990, 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004).

Indeed, scholars have long argued that the criminal justice and welfare are mutually reinforcing systems used to manage poor populations (e.g., Garland 1985; Beckett and Sasson 2004). Welfare policies often target women with dependent children. However, it is not known how these policies may differently affect women's and men's imprisonment. To date, few quantitative studies have examined the effects of welfare provisions on women's imprisonment (for an exception, see Heimer et al. 2012) and no research has examined the effects of gendered inequality and welfare provisions on women's imprisonment vis-à-vis men's. Additional research in this area is needed.

In addition, some recent evidence suggests that welfare retrenchment may have disproportionate consequences for the imprisonment of African American women (e.g., Heimer et al. 2012). Specifically, these scholars draw on research that suggests that

increasingly punitive welfare and criminal justice orientation may have disproportionate consequences for historically disadvantaged minority groups. They cite Soss and colleagues (2008), who argue that racial disparities may arise from policies even in absence of explicit racist discourse or discriminatory intent. Policymakers rely on implicit social classifications, stereotypes and group representations of target populations to inform policy solutions (e.g., Soss, Fording and Schram 2008; Schram, Soss, Fording and Houser 2009). Policies targeting poor populations (including criminal justice and social welfare policies) often rely on assumptions about the root causes and consequences of poverty, as well as dominant stereotypes about the individuals who are most likely to be poor. This may be particularly consequential for the imprisonment of African Americans, given that the prevailing cultural stereotypes often applied here are of lawless, violent minority males in underclass ghettos (Waquant 2009) and lazy, licentious welfare queens (e.g., Quadagno 1996; Hancock 2004). In their empirical work, Heimer and her colleagues (2012) examine the associations between poverty, welfare, race and women's imprisonment and found a positive association between poverty rates and Black women's imprisonment at the state-level. Future research should further examine the intersections of race, gender, welfare and the criminal justice system.

<u>Project Significance: The Collateral Consequences of Mass</u>

<u>Incarceration</u>

The experience of incarceration is concentrated among the most economically and socially vulnerable communities, especially those that are predominantly poor and African American (e.g., Petersilia 2003; Clear 2007). Sharp disparities in imprisonment along class and racial lines result in a subset of the population that is largely excluded

from mainstream social institutions (i.e., labor market, family, social citizenship).

Further, Western and Pettit (2010: 8) argue that the "concentrated and segregative" nature

of incarceration renders the hardships of this population largely invisible to the general

public. Thus, the incarcerated population is often overlooked, and the true amount of

economic inequality is not adequately captured. Excluding this group inflates the black

average wage and gives the appearance of a (artificially) lower black–white wage gap

(e.g., Western and Pettit 2005), while the negative consequences of mass incarceration on

labor market outcomes, family, health, civic engagement and community sustainability

may actually deepen racial labor market disparities over time (e.g., Western and Beckett

2001; Wacquant 2001; Peck and Theodore 2008).

Incarceration is associated with reduced earnings and employment (Western 2006,

2007; Holzer 2007, 2009; Western and Pettit 2010), as evidence suggests that it reduces

the likelihood of obtaining gainful employment and depresses wages in the event of

employment (e.g., Western 2002; Pager 2003). In addition, some scholars argue that the

effects of labor market hardship after incarceration disproportionately affect unskilled

racial and ethnic minorities (e.g., Parks 2011). Specifically, Parks (2011) argues that

unskilled workers of color are disproportionately likely to experience incarceration. Thus,

the collateral consequences of incarceration (e.g., lost jobs, labor market discrimination)

disproportionately affect the groups facing the greatest labor market disadvantages.

Further, some scholars argue that the criminal justice system may be considered a

force for sorting and stratifying young disadvantaged men along racial lines (e.g. Pager

2003, 2007; Pager and Quillian 2005; Peck and Theodore 2008; Pager, Western and

Bonikowski 2009). For example, Pager (2003) utilizes audit methodology (matched

pairs) to examine the ways that race and criminal conviction influence employment opportunities among equally qualified male applicants. Pager (2003: 955) randomly assigns matched pairs of individuals (White and African American) to criminal record/non-criminal record conditions, and finds that the presence of a criminal record resulted in a 50% reduction in the number of callbacks for White applicants. The magnitude of this effect is 40% larger for African Americans (Pager 2003: 959).

Incarceration is associated with marital disruption (Lopoo and Western 2005; Apel, Blokland, Nieuwbeerta, and van Schellen 2010), increasing concentration of poverty in single-mother families (e.g., Manning and Smock 1995; Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Edin and Kefalas 2005), and long-lasting and negative consequences for the children of incarcerated parents (e.g., Grinstead et al. 2001; Western, Kling, and Weiman 2001; Pager 2003; Johnson and Waldfogel 2004; Lopoo and Western 2005; Braman 2004; Edin, Nelson, and Paranal 2004; Green, Ensminger, Robertson and Juon 2006; Western 2006; Kling 2006; Comfort 2008; Murray and Farrington 2008; Geller, Garfinkel, Cooper, and Mincy 2009; Western and Wildeman 2009; Wakefield and Uggen, 2010; Wildeman and Western 2010; Wakefield and Wildeman 2011). Specifically, scholars find that the effects of parental incarceration on children include exacerbation of pre-existing behavioral and mental health issues (Wakefield 2007; Wildeman 2010).

In addition, scholars argue that mass incarceration has long-term effects for poverty and patterns of inter-generational mobility across race (e.g., Wakefield and Wildeman 2011, forthcoming). Specifically, recent findings suggest that rates of incarceration within counties are positively associated with child poverty (and its

persistence into adulthood), and this association appears to be especially pronounced for counties with larger racial and ethnic minority populations (e.g., Wildeman 2009; DeFina and Hannon 2011). Alarmingly, recent evidence suggests the risk of paternal imprisonment is larger for Black children and this has increased in recent decades. By contrast, this risk remains relatively low for White children (e.g., Wildeman 2009).

Although prisoners are guaranteed access to health care by the U.S. Constitution, evidence suggests that the benefits of this access are short-lived and often lost upon release (e.g., Schnittker and John 2007). Incarceration is associated with negative health outcomes, including depression and suicide (e.g., Porporino and Zamble 1984; Toch and Adams 1989; Liebling 1999; Liebling and Maruna 2005; Kruttschnitt and Gartner 2005). Individuals with a history of incarceration are also consistently more likely to be afflicted with infectious diseases and other illnesses associated with stress (e.g., Massoglia 2008a). Other recent works focus on the linkage between incarceration and patterns of HIV infection (e.g., Johnson and Raphael 2006). Additionally, disproportionate incarceration of racial and ethnic minorities may perpetuate racial disparities in health outcomes (e.g., Massoglia 2008b).

Mass incarceration also affects civic engagement and citizenship rights (e.g., Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Manza and Uggen 2006). For example, Manza and Uggen (2006) estimate that 1 in 40 adults lost their right to vote as the result of a felony conviction. [51] In addition, scholars argue that felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities (e.g., Brown-Dean 2004; Pettus 2005; Hull 2006; Manza and Uggen 2006). Specifically, Manza and Uggen (2006) argue

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[51] Or, about 5.4 million Americans, many of whom are no longer incarcerated.

that felon disenfranchisement has profound effects for African American men. These scholars estimate that as many as 1 in 4 African American men are disenfranchised because of felony convictions (Manza and Uggen 2006).

Further, this disenfranchisement has implications for fairness in the criminal justice system. For example, Wheelock (2006) finds that African Americans are less likely than Whites to qualify for jury service, given voter registration requirements. Thus, African American defendants are less likely to be evaluated by African American jurors.

Some scholars further propose that, in addition to being costly (e.g., Mauer 1999; Mauer and Chesney-Lind, 2002) incarceration may actually have criminogenic effects (e.g., Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1988; Miller 1996; Clear 1996, 2007a, 2007b; Roberts 2004). Specifically, Clear (2007) argues that incarcerating large numbers of residents of a limited number of (already disadvantaged) communities often contributes to adverse social dynamics within the affected neighborhoods that may actually foster higher crime rates. Similarly, as Roberts (2004: 1281) notes, mass imprisonment of a community's population "damages social networks, distorts social norms, and destroys social citizenship." Arguably, all of these consequences may interfere with the sustainability and organization within already disadvantaged communities, as incarceration further diminishes residents' family, social, labor market, economic and political resources.

In sum, Western and Pettit (2010: 8) argue that the effects of unequal mass incarceration are "invisible, cumulative and intergenerational." The profound consequences of incarceration are concentrated within the most socially and economically disadvantaged portion of the population. The isolation of this group allows for the understanding of their experiences to be largely unknown by the general public.

Mass incarceration ultimately limits their full participation and citizenship in society, and undermines the sustainability of families and communities, thus contributing to downward mobility for future generations.

<div align="center">Implications for Social Policy</div>

The empirical results of Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that policy interventions aimed at reducing prison admission rates should focus on increasing equality of opportunity. This may be particularly important for historically disadvantaged African American communities. As Wilson (2009) argues, improving the economic situations of African Americans may (eventually) eliminate the cultural adaptations that produce negative employment outcomes and, arguably, reduce the racialized economic threat that has become linked with this group.[52]

Specifically, some research finds that early childhood educational programs offer a promising avenue for reducing later criminal justice system contact (e.g., Lally, Mangione and Honig 1988; Johnson and Walker 1987; Seitz and Apfel 1994; Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett, Belfield, and Nores 2005). Further, given findings that the percent of workers without college education among men and within race are positively associated with prison admission rates, intervention programs should focus on reducing high school dropout rates and increasing educational opportunities and employment rates for young men, unskilled men and particularly for

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[52] Conversely, Massey and Denton (1993) argue that until racial segregation is eliminated, any progress in reducing other forms of racial inequality will be severely limited.

those who are African American (e.g., Howell and Hawkins 1998; Lattimore, Mihalic,

Grotpeter and Taggart 1998; see also Western 2006; Western and Pettit 2010).[53]

Given the findings of this project that unskilled blue collar employment is

inversely associated with prison admission rates, increasing the number of available

opportunities in this sector would likely reduce prison admission rates. Yet, as Espig

Andersen (1999) argues, the blue collar positions available prior to deindustrialization are

not likely to return to the U.S. labor market.[54] However, many of the remaining blue

collar opportunities, such as those in skilled trades (e.g., electrical, plumbing, mechanical,

construction and transportation industries/ occupations), remain a source of higher-paying

employment that cannot be outsourced. Thus, increasing education in skilled trades and

expansion of infrastructure and sustainable energy projects may also provide a source of

quality employment for non-college workers (e.g., Kang and Bishop 1984; Arum and

Shavit 1995; Mane 1998; Shavit and Müller 2000).

Critics may argue that the social and economic costs of imprisonment are offset

by increases public safety, as incarceration may reduce crime through incapacitation and

deterrence of potential offenders (e.g., Marvell and Moody 1997; Rosenfeld 2000;

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[53] However, it should be noted that increasing rates of college educational attainment (and/or saturating the labor market with low-wage workers) should not be considered a panacea, as the rewards associated with skill are due (in part) to scarcity (e.g., Parkin 1979; Weeden 2002).

[54] Specifically, Espig Andersen (1999) suggests that the U.S. economy has entered a new era of polarization, such that the middle class is decreasing and a new economic "underclass" is increasing (see also Leicht and Fitzgerald 2006). Global capital mobility and trade are often thought to be the culprits of deindustrialization, as unskilled workers are no longer cushioned by Keynesian economics or import protection and must compete on the open market. However, technological change should be considered the primary source of falling demand for unskilled workers (as opposed to outsourcing), as this raises returns to education and reduces demand for unskilled and less experienced workers. Thus, net jobs have increased but they are not often positions that provide superior welfare (i.e., virtually all net new jobs are in the service sector).

Spelman 2000, 2008; Levitt 2004). Yet, as Western and Pettit (2010: 18-19) argue, these

findings remain the subject of scholarly debate[55] and the social costs of imprisonment in

the foregoing discussion arguably outweigh the small gains in public safety (see also

Lynch and Sabol 2004; Clear 2007). Thus, policy efforts should focus resources toward

reducing social and economic inequalities and building community sustainability, both of

which may often increase informal social control (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls

1997; Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999).

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

The relationships between local economic and labor market contexts and

imprisonment rates are not yet understood fully. Prior to this project, research had yet to

consider how specific labor market shifts (e.g., deindustrialization) affects the economic

situations of unskilled workers and how the same shifts also influence prison admission

rates. The empirical findings of Chapter 4 suggest that the percent of workers without

college education among men and restricted unskilled blue collar employment are

positively associated with prison admission rates within the corresponding local areas.

Arguably, this has important consequences for historically disadvantaged minority groups

and poor populations that are disproportionately imprisoned (e.g., Mauer 2006; Western

2006; Uggen and Manza 2006) and has major consequences for future generations (e.g.,

Western and Pettit 2010; Wakefield and Wildeman 2011, forthcoming).

This research is a necessary step in understanding how imprisonment patterns are

shaped by local labor market conditions and economic inequality, and particularly their

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[55] For example, other studies find that the effects of imprisonment on crime rates are small or non-significant (e.g., DeFina and Arvanites 2002; Western 2006).

impact on historically disadvantaged minorities and the poor. Imprisonment is a major

state intervention into individual lives, and many scholars argue that mass incarceration

has profound consequences that go beyond prison walls and may actually deepen

inequality over time (e.g., Western and Beckett 1999; Wacquant 2001; Peck and

Theodore 2008). Results from this research may be used to inform policy in order to

better target the issues facing groups experiencing economic hardship. Doing so may also

help to reduce the unintended but widespread and profoundly negative consequences of

incarceration for family, health and subsequent labor market and economic hardships.

APPENDIX

Table A-1: Missing Data by Variable

Variable / Data Source	Year(s)	Missing States / PUMAs
Prison Admission Rates		
National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP)	1989 and 1999	Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming
Local Political Partisanship		
General Election Data for the United States	1990	Honolulu, HI (542), Rochester, MN and Grand Forks, ND (245-254), St. Louis, MO (261), Non-metro area in Washington state (495)
Federal Elections Project	2000	Colorado Springs, CO (54), Champaign / Urbana, IL (104), Naperville / Joliet, IL (108)
Serious Felonies Known to Police		
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Return A	1988 and 1989	Los Angeles, CA (47), Chicago / Naperville, IL (109), Lansing, MI (206), Flint, MI (207), Grand Rapids, MI (215), Detroit, MI (217-236), Ann Arbor, MI (244), Minneapolis/ St. Paul, MN (252), Edison, NJ (286), Newark, NJ (289-291, 300), Trenton, NJ (310), New York, NY (295-299, 302 and 305), Buffalo, NY (333), Rochester, NY (337), Syracuse, NY (339), Cleveland, OH (379), Seattle, WA (497), Milwaukee, WI (528)
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Return A	1998 and 1999	Los Angeles, CA (47), Decatur, IL (103), Champaign / Urbana, IL (104), Bloomington / Normal, IL (105), Peoria, IL (106), Lake County / Kenosha, IL / WI (107), Chicago / Naperville, IL (110), Non-metropolitan areas, KY (154-163), Cincinnati metro, OH / KY (164-166), Louisville, KY (168, 170), Lansing, MI (206), Flint, MI (207-208), Grand Rapids, MI (215), Detroit, MI (217-236), Ann Arbor, MI (244), Minneapolis/ St. Paul, MN (252, 254), Edison, NJ (286), Newark, NJ (289-291, 300), Trenton, NJ (310), New York, NY (295-299, 302 and 305), Buffalo, NY (333), Rochester, NY (337), Syracuse, NY (339), Cleveland, OH (379), Columbia, SC (435), Seattle, WA (497), Milwaukee, WI (528)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are CONSPUMA codes. Some metropolitan areas span multiple CONSPUMAs. Thus, a missing CONSPUMA does not necessarily indicate the exclusion of the entire metropolitan area from the analysis.

**Figure A-1: Diagnostic Plots of Prison Admission Rates and Predicted Values of X
(Study 1: Overall Prison Admission Rate)**

Figure A-1 (Cont.)

Figure A-1 (Cont.)

```
 .806154 +
         |              *
         |
         |        *              *
   F     |   ***            * *                    *
   i     |    * *  *            * *    *
   t     |   * ***       *    * *  *     *      *
   t     |   ******   *   *  *  *   **          *
   e     | * * **** ******        *                           *
   d     |   *******  ***    *   *   **   *  *  *      *     *
         |   ******  *  **   ***      *  *
   v     |   ****** ********** *   *  *  * **    *    *    *    * *  *
   a     |   * ******* ** * ** * *      * *  **      *            *
   l     |   *******  **  * ***  **  **        *  *
   u     |    ** ***    **** *      **          *
   e     |   * *** ***   ***  **** *     *      *
   s     |     *  *  ** *        *       *  *
         |     *    *         * *
         |        *        *            *
         |              *
 -.340493 +                    *            *
          +------------------------------------------------------------+
          -.296436              Local Percent Latino           13.9029
```

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 .806154 +
         |                 *
         |
         |                        *                        *
   F     |              **  *  *  *      *  *
   i     |           ** *     *** *
   t     |           *** *** **      **
   t     |         **   **** ** ***** *        *
   e     |      *    * ** *  * ***** *   * ***
   d     |     *  * * * ** * ******* ***  *
         |    ***    * ** ****** ** * * *
   v     |     * *** ******** ****** *
   a     |    * ** *************** *****          *
   l     |  *    *   ************** *** *
   u     |     * **  ****** ***** *           *
   e     | *  *  *  ******** * * *
   s     |     *  * *   ** *        *
         |      * ***
         |      *     *        *
         |              *            *
         |                        *
 -.340493 +          **
          +------------------------------------------------------------+
          -6.40213           Local Percent Unskilled Male     9.56657
```

Figure A-1 (Cont.)

Figure A-1 (Cont.)

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.806154 +
        |                                        *
        |
        |                                        *
 F      |                                        *                           *
 i      | *                                      *                           *
 t      | *                                      *                           *
 t      | *                                      *                           *
 e      | *                                      *                           *
 d      | *                                      *                           *
        | *                                      *                           *
 v      | *                                      *                           *
 a      | *                                      *                           *
 l      | *                                      *                           *
 u      | *                                      *                           *
 e      | *                                      *                           *
 s      | *                                      *                           *
        | *                                                                  *
        |                                                                    *
        |                                        *
-.340493 +                                                                   *
        +----------------------------------------------------------------+
           -1                    Republican Governor (ind.)              1
```

```
.806154 +
        |                                                   *
        |
        |
 F      |                                        *        *
 i      |                                          * *  ** *
 t      |                                          *  * ***
 t      |                                        * ** **** **  *
 e      |                              *       ** ******** *
 d      |                                  **************
        |                                  *********** ** *
 v      |                           *** **************   *
 a      |                   *         ********** *** *
 l      |                          * ******************  *                   *
 u      |                          *********** **** * **
 e      |                          * **** *** * **** *
 s      |                        * **** * ******  **  *
        |                            *  *** *
        |                            *  **
        |                            ** *
        | *
-.340493 +                              *  *
        +----------------------------------------------------------------+
         -49.5607           Local Percent Voting Republican   34.5596
```

Figure A-2: Diagnostic Plots of Race-Disaggregated Prison Admission Rates and Predicted Values of X (Study 2: Black Prison Admission Rate)

Figure A-2 (Cont.)

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340.601 +
        |                                                    *
   L    |
   i    |
   n    |
   e    |                                                    *
   a    |
   r    |                                       *    *
        |                                            *    **
   p    |                      *               *  *** *
   r    |                                      ******  *
   e    |                                      ******** *   *
   d    |                   *         *   *   *******
   i    |                             *       ***** *
   c    |                   *         *  **** *      *      *
   t    |                        *        *  ** **
   i    |                                  *  *  *  *
   o    | *                            *
   n    |
        |
-261.11 +                                      *              *
        +------------------------------------------------------+
      -1404.59              Felony Crime Rate              902.457
```

```
340.601 +
        |               *
   L    |
   i    |
   n    |         *
   e    |
   a    |      *     *
   r    |        **   *
        |      * ***   *
   p    |  ** ****            *          *
   r    |  ********** ****
   e    |  ** **********  *    *
   d    | *  ********** **
   i    |     * *** *    *    **
   c    | *  *    *   *   *    *
   t    |       *  *
   i    |          *            *
   o    |                            *
   n    |
        |
-261.11 +      *                                *
        +------------------------------------------------------+
      -782.737            Local Percent Black            6833.63
```

Figure A-2 (Cont.)

Figure A-2 (Cont.)

```
340.601 +
        |         *
  L     |
  i     |
  n     |
  e     | *
  a     |
  r     |       **
        |   *        *  *
  p     |        *    * * *    *
  r     |     *  *   **  ********* *
  e     |       *   ***************   *            *
  d     |          * * ***************     *
  i     |           **  * * *********   *
  c     |        *    * *  *  *** *        *
  t     |             *     ** **
  i     |             *           * *
  o     |             *           *
  n     |
        |
-261.11 +                         *       *
        +----------------------------------------------------------+
      -364.932                White Disadvantage           739.429
```

```
340.601 +
        |                          *
  L     |
  i     |
  n     |
  e     |                       *
  a     |
  r     |                   *   *
        |                   *    *  *
  p     |                *     *  * *          *
  r     |        *    *** ** ****   *  *   * **    *
  e     |      *    ********* ********* ****   * *****    *
  d     |     *  **  ************************** ** *** *
  i     | *  *** ** ** *********** ***** **  *        *
  c     | *        * ** *    *** *    ***
  t     |      * * *          *       *      *
  i     |                  *      * *
  o     |     *        *
  n     |
        |
-261.11 +                  *  *
        +----------------------------------------------------------+
     -1872.88            Percent Unskilled Blacks         1713.37
```

Figure A-2 (Cont.)

```
340.601 +
        |                                                  *
    L   |
    i   |
    n   |
    e   |                                           *
    a   |
    r   |                               *           *
        |                                             *  *
    p   |                           *               **  **   *
    r   |                     * * **   * **** * **       *  *
    e   |                   * ** * ** ***************
    d   |          *  **         ***** ***********
    i   |            **  * *    ******************* *
    c   |         *        *     *   * ** *****        *
    t   |       *            *        * * *           *
    i   |                          * *
    o   |  * *
    n   |
        |
-261.11 +                        *                    *
        +---------------------------------------------------------+
        -3161.1           Percent Unskilled Workers      501.108
```

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340.601 +
        |                          *
    L   |
    i   |
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    e   |              *
    a   |                      *          *
    r   |                  *       *       *
        |             *        *       *          *   **
    p   |                 *  * **  *** **  ****  *      *  *    *
    r   |            *    * *  *** ***** ************** *   * * **
    e   |       **         ******************** *    *
    d   | *                ***  *  *  * ****************** *
    i   |           *      *   *** **      *  * *
    c   |                   *            *         **   *
    t   |                *        *             *
    i   |                 *        *                   *
    o   |
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        |
-261.11 +                      *                    *
        +---------------------------------------------------------+
        -1730.02        Unskilled Blue Collar Employment    566.159
```

**Figure A-3: Diagnostic Plots of Race-Disaggregated Prison Admission Rates and Predicted Values of X (Study 2: White Prison Admission Rate)**

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340.601 +
        |            *
   L    |
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   a    |
   r    |                          *              *
        |    *         *                 *
   p    | ***            *                    *        *
   r    | ****    *    *   *    *            *
   e    | ******  *         *  *       *
   d    | ********           *                        *
   i    | **** ***      **   *     *   *     *
   c    |  ****     *                          *              *
   t    |  *  *  **
   i    |  *   *                    *
   o    |          *   *
   n    |
        |
-261.11 +    *            *
        +----------------------------------------------------------------+
          -16.6609          Puma Population (millions)          1079.17
```

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340.601 +
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   n    |
   e    |                    *
   a    |
   r    |                                  *              *
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   p    |     *          *     *      *        *         *
   r    |     ****  * ****** *    *     **     *
   e    | ** **************** *  ***        *        *
   d    | **************** *** *     *
   i    | *****************   ** * *
   c    | *  ******      **        *         *
   t    |      ** * *     *
   i    |      ***
   o    |        *        *
   n    |
        |
-261.11 +    *    *
        +----------------------------------------------------------------+
          16.7259            State Imprisonment Rate            1122.24
```

Figure A-3 (Cont.)

Figure A-3 (Cont.)

Figure A-3 (Cont.)

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340.601 +
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  a     |
  r     |                        *  *
        |                        *      *        *
  p     |            *      *                 **     **
  r     |                   *  *  *   **   *  ****    *    *
  e     | *             *        **  **  *  *  *************    *  *
  d     |                          ** *******************  *           *
  i     |                      *    **************  **  *
  c     |                  *          ** * ****   *    *
  t     |                             *        ** **
  i     |                             *              *   *
  o     |                               *          *
  n     |
        |
-261.11 +                                          **
        +----------------------------------------------------------+
      -1312.69                White Disadvantage            832.893
```

```
340.601 +
        |                              *
  L     |
  i     |
  n     |
  e     |                              *
  a     |
  r     |                             **
        |                             **
  p     |                             *****
  r     |                           *****   *  *
  e     |                    **  ************ *  *       **              *
  d     |                    *****************  ****  *  *
  i     | *         *       ***   ****  ********* *
  c     |                             **   ****
  t     |                             *** **
  i     |                              *
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  n     |
        |
-261.11 +                             **
        +----------------------------------------------------------+
      -22537.8              Percent Unskilled Blacks        23063.2
```

Figure A-3 (Cont.)

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